Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 8

Number 2

Article 1

December 2019

A Guide to Federal Oil and Gas Income Taxation
Harold S. Bloomenthal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Harold S. Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Oil and Gas Income Taxation, 8 WYO. L.J. 83 (1954)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol8/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

A GUIDE TO FEDERAL OIL AND GAS INCOME TAXATION
By HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL*
Copyright 1954 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL
INTRODUCION

This article is written primarily for the reader who has some knowledge of oil and gas law and of the federal income tax laws, but relatively
little knowledge of the special impact of the federal income tax laws on
oil and gas transactions.' The more important tax provisions affecting
the exploration and production phases of the oil and gas industry are those
relating to (1) income2-ordinary, depletable and capital; (2) depletion;
(3) intangible drilling and development costs; (4) depreciation and (5)
losses-ordinary, capital and net operating. These provisions are in large
part interrelated and one of the objectives of this article is to correlate the
various provisions and present an integrated account of their overall effect.
Any attempt to encompass within the space limitations of an article
the multitude of problems involved in oil and gas taxation must necessarily
be oversimplified. Justice Frankfurter has observed that the distinctions
drawn in some oil and gas tax cases "hardly can be held in the mind longer
than it takes to state them." 3 The shortcomings of the law in this and other
respects have been discussed with considerable skill elsewhere; 4 this article
for the most part is concerned with what the law is, to the extent ascertainable, rather than what it should be. The author has attempted to set
forth a guide to routine oil and gas tax practice and to indicate the areas
in which the law has not clearly crystallized.
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
1. The best oil and gas treatise with which the author is familiar is the OIL AND GAS
FEDERAL INCOME TAX MANUAL (7th ed. 1953) prepared by the national accounting
Unfortunately this manual
firm of Arthur Andersen & Co. (Omaha, Nebraska).
although fairly widely distributed is not available for sale. The proceedings of the
annual institutes on oil and gas law and taxation of the Southwestern Legal Foundation contain a number of excellent oil and gas tax articles and reference to a number
of such articles is made in the subsequent notes. MILLER, OIL AND GAS TAXATION
(2nd ed. 1951) published by Commerce Clearing House is also a useful treatise. The
OIL AND GAS TAX QUARTERLY published four times a year by Mathew Bender & Co.,
Inc. contains articles and comments by oil and gas tax experts discussing various oil
and gas tax problems and is of assistance in keeping informed on current developments in this field.
2. "Ordinary income" is generally referred to as either being subject to the depletion
allowance or not subject to the depletion allowance. In this article reference to
"ordinary income" is to income not subject to the depletion allowance. Income
subject to the depletion allowance will be referred to as depletable income.
3. Concurring in Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Comm., 328 U.S. 25, 38; 66 Sup. Ct. 861, 868
(1946).
4. For good discussions of the technical shortcomings see Bergen, Oil and Taxes--Some
Problems and Proposals, 26 So. CALIF. L. REv. 396 (1953); JACKSON, The Need for a
Restatement of the Tax Laws Relating to Oil and Gas in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
With respect to
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 345 (1949).
the pros and cons relating to justification (or lack thereof) of the special tax benefits
accorded the oil industry see Baker and Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence, 64 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1951); Blum, How to Get All (But All) the Tax
Advantages of Dabbling in Oil, 31 TAXES 343 (1953); Ray, The Attack on Percentage
Depletion in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW
AND TAXATION 541 (1951).
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Tax advantages 5 resulting from the choice of particular alternatives
are considered in connection with the discussion of particular problems.
In addition a few general fundamentals will serve as a guide to many of the
more common situations:
(1) Ordinarily it is desirable to a party receiving income to have it
taxed as a long term capital gain rather than as ordinary or depletable
income. The reason is the obvious one that long term capital gains are
taxable at a maximum rate of 26%, whereas ordinary income is taxable at
rates as high as 92% for individuals. 6
(2) As a corollary to the foregoing proposition it is ordinarily desirable to have a transaction regarded as a sale rather than a lease or sublease
in that any considertion received by the "vendor" in a lease or sublease
transaction must be treated as depletable income. 7
(3) If income cannot be considered as a capital gain, it is desirable,
if possible, for it to fall within the depletable income classification. The
reason is that the recipient of depletable income is entitled to take cost
depletion or statutory depletion (27V/% of gross income), whichever is the
8
larger, within the limitations subsequently noted.
(4) It is desirable for the taxpayer incurring expenditures for the
development of oil and gas properties to have as small an amount as possible
charged to capital expenditures recoverable through depletion.9
The
reason is that if such charges are capitalized the taxpayer frequently realizes
no tax benefit therefrom in that statutory depletion can be taken in any
event and does not depend on the cost basis of the property.' 0
(5) It is desirable for the taxpayer financing the drilling of a well to
be in a position to deduct the intangible drilling costs as a current expense
and to recover through depreciation expenditures on physical equipment."
Otherwise, such expenditures must be capitalized by the taxpayer as part
of the acquisition costs of the oil and gas interest and recovered through
12
depletion.
5.

For an excellent article stressing such advantages see Jackson, Tax Planning Before
Drilling, XXVII TULANE L. REV. 21 (1952). See also ANDERSON, op. Cit. supra note 1,
at 191-211.
6. Rates on ordinary income cited in the text apply to calendar years 1952, 1953 and
fiscal years beginning after 10-31-51 and before 1-1-54. For calendar year 1954 and
fiscal years beginning after 12-31-53 the maximum tax on ordinary income to individuals is 91%. INT. REv. CODE Secs. 11, 12. The maximum rate on a long term
capital gain drops to 25% on April 1, 1954 but only with respect to a taxpayer whose
fiscal year begins after March 31, 1954. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 117(c).

7. See injra 107-108.
8. See infra 90-91.
9. The phrase "recoverable through depletion" is a short-hand method of saying that
the amount expended is amortized through the depletion allowance. "Recoverable
through depreciation" or "depreciable items" is a short-hand method of saying
that the amount expended is amortized through the depreciation deduction.
10. This point is expanded on in note 97 and related text.
11. As to the distinction between tangibles and intangibles see infra 97; as to the
distinction between capital costs recoverable through depreciation and capital costs
recoverable through depletion see infra 105.
12. See infra 99.
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(6) It is desirable with respect to each separate property for 50%/ of
the taxpayer's net income (after deductions for all expenses including current intangibles) to be equal to or in excess of 27/2% of the taxpayer's
gross income from the property. The reason is that the statutory depletion
allowance of 2 7 1/2% of the gross income cannot exceed 50% of the taxpayer's
net income from the particular property.' 3
(7) Net operating losses should be avoided by the taxpayer if possible.
Inasmuch as the taxpayer must reduce the net operating loss by the amount
statutory depletion exceeds cost depletion for the year of the loss and for
every year in which the loss is carried back or forward, he is deprived of a
large part of the tax benefit that could be derived by offsetting the loss
14
against current income.
(8) It is ordinarily desirable to be taxed as an individual or partnership and not as a corporation. The reason is that if taxed as a corporation
the income from the oil property will be subject to double taxation and
the taxpayer will be unable to receive the full benefit of the statutory
depletion allowance.' 5
(9) It is ordinarily desirable to have a transaction regarded as a taxexempt exchange or pooling arrangement rather than a sale. The reason
is the obvious one that no tax is paid with respect to such transactions
whereas a gain from a sale is subject to taxation.' 6
ORDINARY INCOME

The principal items of ordinary income not subject to the depletion
deduction are delay rentals received by the lessor from the lessee' 7 and
sums received by the owner of the property in return for a grant, unaccompanied by an option to lease, of the privilege to conduct seismograph or
other geological surveys on his property.' 8 Sums received for an option to
lease never exercised are also ordinary income to the recipient not subject
to depletion. 19 The taxpayer incurring expenditures for the privilege of
conducting geological work or for an option must capitalize such expendi13. See infra 91.
14. See infra 113.
15. See infra 127.
16. See infra 126.

17. Comm. v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935). "Delay rental is a sum paid under
the terms of a lease for the privilege of continuing the lessee's interest without developing the property." G, C. M. 11197, XII-1 CUM. BULL. 238, 240 (1933).

18. Special Ruling, June 18, 1951, CCH 1952 FED. TAx. REP. Par. 6105.
19. No case or specific ruling to the author's knowledge expressly relates to this problem.
The only theory on which an option payment could be regarded as depletable income
to the recipient is that it constitutes additional "bonus" and as such is an advance
royalty. However, if the option is never exercised and no lease ever acquired thereunder the payment obviously cannot be a royalty payment. ANDERSEN, Op. cit. supra
note I, at p. 3 suggests tbIat an option payment be regarded as additional "bonus"
and depletion deducted with respect thereto, but that such deduction be restored to
income if at the termination of the option period the option is not exercised or if the
option is exercised but the leases acquired thereunder are abandoned or terminated
without production. As to "bonus" payments generally and restoration of previous
depletion deduction to income see infra 86-87.
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tures as part of the acquisition costs of the lease (if acquired) and recover
same through depletion 20 or write them off as an ordinary loss if no lease
is acquired. 2 1 However, as to expenditures incurred for delay rentals the
taxpayer can regard them either as current expenses or capital costs in the
23
22
nature of carrying charges recoverable through the depletion allowance.
DEPLETION DEDUCTION

There are two principal sources of income which is subject to the
depletion allowance: Frist, income received in the forn of bonus as consideration for a lease or sub-lease. 24 Second, income received by those
having an "economic interest" in oil and gas in place from the proceeds
from production.23 5 The distinction between a lease or sublease and a sale
is discussed in detail below;

26

suffice it to note for the present in this regard

that income (generally referred to as a "bonus") received in connection
with a leasing or subleasing transaction is regarded as depletable income
whereas income from a sale is either capital income or ordinary non27
depletable income.
The typical example of bonus
landowner (lessor) from the lessee
an oil and/or gas lease. However,
executing a sublease is also bonus
consequences. 28

income is the money received by the
as consideration for the execution of
income received as consideration for
income and subject to the same tax

Bonus income is regarded as advance royalty for tax pur-

poses 2 9 and the recipient is entitled to take the statutory depletion deduction with respect thereto in the year received 8 0 regardless of whether any
production is obtained or whether there is any reasonable assurance of
20. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10(a); Sunray Oil Co. v. Comm., 147 F.2d 962
l10th C T .1945). Note with Tespert to the Teglatluns cited that the new income tax
regulations as approved September 23, 1953 are all 118 regulations (previously they
were 111 regulations) and all contain the prefix 39, whereas previously they contained the prefix 29. Although some changes have been made, for the most part the
niew regulations correspond with the previous ones; thus Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10
corresponds with previous Reg. 111, Sec. 29.23 (m) -10.
21. See infra 114-116.
22. INT. REV. CoDE Sec. 24(a) (7); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.24 (a) -6; G.C.M. 11197,
XII-I CUM. BULL. 238 (1933).
In order to capitalize delay rentals the taxpayer must
so elect in a statement filed with his return. A new election in this respect may be
made each year and the election is available as to each separate property. Sec discussion in II OIL AND GAS TAX QUARTERLY 206-208 (1953).
23. Ibid.
24. U.S. Treas. Reg .118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 74
(1932); Sunray Oil Co. v, Comm., 147 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1945).
25. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m)-1 (b).
26. See infra 108-110.
2'7. Anderson v. He'lvering, 310 U.S. 404, 60 Sup. Ct. 952 (1194o); Burnet v. liarmel, 2
U.S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 74 (1932).
28. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 Sup. Ct. 225 (1933). An assignment by a lessee
of the entire leasehold rights reserving an overriding royalty is a typical subleasing
transaction.
29. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10 (a) and (d).
30. Theoretically it is possible to take cost depletion with respect to a bonus payment
and the appropriate procedure for computing same is set forth in U.S. Treas. Reg.
118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10 (a). However, it ordinarily is more feasible to take statutory
depletion. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10 (d).
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obtaining production. 8 x If any production is obtained under the lease or
sublease, involved, the recipient of the bouns need make no further adjustment. 2 If, however, the lease expires, terminates or is abandoned without
any production under the lease, the recipient of the bonus must restore
the depletion deduction previously taken to income in the year in which
the lease terminates, expires or is abandoned.93
The lessee paying the bonus must capitalize such expenditure as part
34
of the acquisition cost of the lease and recover same through depletion.
He may, however, take such expenditure as an ordinary loss in the year in
which he abandons the lease8 5 or as a capital or ordinary loss as the case
may be in the event he sells the property in the year of sale to the extent
that the purchase price is less than his adjusted cost basis.8 6 In the event
the lease is productive the lessee must exclude a pro-rata part of the bonus
from his depletable gross income from production.8 7 However, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the taxpayer-lessee deducts an
allocated part of the bonus only for the purpose of determining statutory
depletion and cannot deduct an allocated part for the purpose of determining his taxable income from the property38
The depletion deduction allowed in connection with bonus income has
been referred to by one court as "synthetic depletion."80 The primary
source of income subject to the depletion allowance is not from transactions
40
of this type, but is from the proceeds derived from the sale of oil and gas.
Only those who have an "economic interest" in the oil and gas in place
can take the depletion allowance with respect to the proceeds derived from
31.

32.

33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

Herring v. Comm., 293 U.S. 322, 55 Sup. Ct. 179 (1934); Marrs McLean, 41 B.T.A.
565 (1940).
In Dolores Crabb, 41 B.TA. 686 (1940) aeq. 1940-2 Cum. BPuLL. 2 taxpayer-lessor had
taken a depletion deduction on the bonus in the amount of $4,125, but was not required to restore any part of the deduction although at the time of abandonment
of the lease the total royalties from production amounted to only $36.98.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-10(c); Sneed v. Comm., 119 F.2d 767 (5th Cir.
1941). The previous depletion deduction taken with respect to the payment of the
"bonus" must be restored to income even if the previous deduction did not result
in a tax benefit. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.22(b) (12) -1; Douglas v. Comm., 322
U.S. 275, 64 Sup. Ct. 988 (1944). The taxpayer, however, car restore to the capital
account (his basis in the property) any amount previously deducted as an adjustment thereto because of depletion .taken on the "bonus". U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec.
39.23 (m) -10 (c).
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10(a).
See infra 114.
As to the situations in which the loss will be a capital loss or an ordinary loss see
infra I10-Il1.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1 (e) (5) requires that the lessee make this allocation with respect to previous bonus payments by excluding from his gross income
from the property for the purposes of computing statutory depletion the amount
of the previous bonus payment allocable to the current tax year. Thus if the bonus
payment was $100,000 and the estimated reserves are 100,000 bbls., assuming a production during the current tax year of 10,000 bbl., the lessee in computing statutory
depletion would have to reduce his gross income by one-tenth of the original bonus
payment which would be $10,000.
Sunray Oil Co. v. Comm., 147 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1945).
Driscoll v. Comm., 147 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1945).
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -l (e) (1) .
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production. 41 As the result of considerable litigation it is now fairly clear
that. the owners of the following oil and gas interests have an economic
43
42
oil
overriding royalty,
interest for this purpose: landowner's royalty,

payment, 44 net profit interest, 45 working interest, 46 and participating interest 47. The owner of an "economic interest" can take a deduction for
depletion without respect to whether his interest entitles him to a share of
the production in kind or a share of the proceeds from the sale of pro48
duction.
The depletion deduction allowed is cost depletion or statutory deple41. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -I (b) .
42 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 Sup. Ct. 225 (1933).
A landowner's royalty is the
royalty reserved by the lessor under an oil and gas lease. Typically the oil anti
gas lease provides that the lessor shall receive one-eighth of the production as a royalty
free of all development and operating costs.
43. Palmer v. Bender, supra note 42; Hogan v. Comm., 141 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1944); E. F.
Simms, 28 B.T.A. 988 (1933) acq. in XV-2 CUM. BULL. 22 (1936).
An overriding
royalty is generally created by the lessee assigning the lease and reserving a specified
cost free royalty.
44. Perkints v. Thoms, 9151 U.S. 655, 57 Sup. Ct. 911 (t9T9
", T. W. Lee v. Commt., 126
F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942); Comm. v. O'Shaughnessy, Inc., 124 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1941).
An oil payment is an interest under which the holder receives a specified fraction
of the production (or a specified amount per barrel of oil produced) until he has
received a specified payment. A typical oil payment provides that the owner is to
receive $300,000, or some other specified amount, payable only out of one-tenth or
some other specified fraction of production. However, in order to be an economic
interest the oil payment must be payable solely out of the proceeds from production
from the particular property and there must be no possibility that part of the payment may be from some source other than such proceeds. Anderson v. Helvering,
310 U.S. 404, 60 Sup. 'Ct. 952 (1940); M-B-K Drilling Co. v. Comm., 194 F.2d 221
(2nd Cir. 1952); T. W. Lee v. Comm., supra.
45. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm, 326 U.S. 599, 66 Supt. Ct. 409 (1946); Burton-Sutton
Oil Co. v. Comm., 328 U.S. 25, 66 Sup. Ct. 861 (1946). A net profit interest ordinarily
is a contractual right to receive a specified percentage of the net proceeds from
production. Net proceeds are usually defined so as to permit the operator to deduct
the net profit interest holder's proportionate share of the operating costs and in some
cases of the costs of development. It differs from a working interest in that the net
profit interest owner has no right to develop the property and ordinarily does not
own any interest in the lease equipment. There is some confusion in the cases in
that the Kirby case supra, and Burton-Sutton case, supra, did not expressly overrule
Elbe Oil Land Development Co. v. Helvering, 303 U.S. 372, 58 Sup. Ct. 621 (1938)
and O'Donnell v. Helvering, 303 U.S. 372, 58 Sup. Ct. 619 (1938) in which the
Supreme Court had previously held that a net profit interest was not an economic
interest with respect to wlich depletion can be taken. In the Kirby case the Court
distinguished the O'Donnell case on the ground that in the O'Donnell case the net
profit interest was created in a stranger to the lease. There is some possibility,
therefore, that where the net profit interest is created by a grant carving out such
interest from the lease rather than by a reservation by the assignor of the lease that
it may not be an economic interest in the oil and gas in place. It has also been
suggested that because of the decision in Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404. 60 Sup.
Ct. 952 (1940) if the net profit agreement provides that the proceeds from the sale
of equipment are to be taken into account in determining net profits that the net
profit interest may not be an "economic interest". See Bergen, supra note 2, at 415416.
A working interest is
46. Greensboro Gas. Co. v. Comm., 79 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1935).
generally an interest in an oil and gas lease which gives the interest owner either
the exclusive or non-exclusive right to develop the oil and gas4 property.
47. Kiesau Petroleum Corp., 42 B.T.A. 69 (1940) acq. 1940-2 Cum'. BULL. 4. A participating interest is a contractual right to a specified portion of the production. If it is
subject to part of the operating costs it is much like a net profit interest created in a
stranger to the lease and if it is not subject to any part of the cost it is much like
an overriding royalty in a stranger to the lease.
48. Greensboro Gas Co. v. Comm., 30 B.T.A. 1362 (1934) af 'd in 79 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir.

1935).
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tion, whichever is the greater. 49 The use of the method resulting in the
larger depletion allowance is mandatory in determining the taxpayer's
adjusted basis in the property.5" The taxpayer does not elect as to the
method to be employed in determining depletion (although the data to
compute both cost and statutory depletion should be included) and the
use of one method in one year does not preclude the use of the other in
subsequent years. 51 It is important to note with respect to the computation
of statutory depletion that separate computations must be made for each
52
separate property.
In computing cost depletion it is necessary to first determine the cost
basis of the property in question.53 This will include all of the acquisition
costs of the property 54 such as expenditures for seismograph and other
58
57
56
geological data, 55 abstract and attorney fees, bonuses, options, and at
59
the taxpayer's election delayed rentals and intangible drilling and development costs 60 relating to the property in question. The cost basis oi the
property for depletion purposes is divided by the estimated number of
recoverable barrels of oil (or thousand cubic feet of gas) attributable to
the interest of the taxpayer in the particular property to obtain the unit
(per barrel or per thousand cubic feet) depletion allowance. This per
unit depletion figure is then multiplied by the number of such units
(barels or thousand cubic feet) produced during the tax year and attributable to the taxpayer's interest and the resulting figure is the deduction
permitted as cost depletion."'
Statutory depletion is computed by the multiplying the gross income
attributable to the taxpayer's interest from the particular oil and gas property by 271%.62 The resulting figure must be reduced to the extent that
63
it exceeds 50% of the taxpayer's net income from the particular property.
Statutory depletion can never exceed 2712%" of the gross income from 100%
of production from the property. 64 Accordingly, the operator must exclude
from his gross income that part of the proceeds paid to the holders of other
economic interests in the oil and gas in place (such as the landowner's
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Sec. 23(m) ; INT. REV. CODE Sec. 114 (b) (3) ; US. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec.
39.23 (m) -4.
Producers Oil Corp., 43 B.T.A. 9 (1940) acq. 1941-1 CUM. BULL. 8.
Ibid.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 59.23 (m) -4.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -2 (a).
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.113 (a).
I. T. 4006, 1950-1 CUM BULL. 48.
Munger v. Comm., 14 T. G. 1236 (1950).
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10 (a).
Ibid.
INT. RED. CODE Sec. 24(a) (7); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.24 (a) -6; G.C.M. 11197,
YII-I CUM. BULL. 238 (1933). See discussion at note 22 and related text.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -2 (d); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16. See
infra 9.5.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -2.
INT. REV. CODE Sec. 114(b) (3); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -4.
Note 62 supra.
Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 US. 312, 55 Sup. Ct. 174 (1934).
INT. REV. CODE

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

royalty, the overriding royalty, net profit interest, etc.) and the holder of
each economic interest computes statutory depletion with respect to his
share of the proceeds. 65 In this respect the operator excludes only the net
amount payable to the holder of a net profit interest and the holder of
such interest takes statutory depletion only with respect to the net amount
received by him. 68
Gross income for depletion purposes is the sales price of oil or gas in
the immediate vicinity of the Well. 67 Accordingly any amount deducted
for the payment of severance or other production taxes should be added
back in computing gross income for depletion purposes.", On.the other
hand transportation costs and gathering charges are deducted from the
sales price in determining gross income for this purpose.69 An allocated
part of any bonus previously paid by the taxpayer must be deducted from
the gross income attributable to the taxpayer's interest in determining the
amount of taxpayer's gross income subject to the depletion allowance.7 0
In determining taxpayer's net income for the purposes of the 50% net
income limitation, gross income to the taxpayer is the same gross income
figure used in computing the 27V2% depletion allowance. 71 Net income is
65. Ibid. The amount excluded from gross income which represents the share of production of another owner of an economic interest in place is excluded generally not
only for purposes of determining statutory depletion but for the purpose of determining the taxpayer's taxable income. Or as stated by the Supreme Court ". . the
same basic issue determines both to whom income derived from the production of oil
and gas is taxable and to whom a deduction for depletion is allowable." Anderson v.
Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 407; 60 Sup. Ct. 952, 954 (1940). Accordingly, if part of the
gross income is payable to the holder of an economic interest in place it is excluded
from the payor's gross income and is income to the recipient who can take depletion
with respect thereto; if payable to someone other than an owner of an economic
interest in place it is an assignment of income and the payor must include the amount
paid in his gross income for the purpose of determining his taxable income and can
take statutory depletion with respect thereto. Anderson v. Helvering, supra. However, the allocated part of the bonus that must be deducted by the lessee in determining his gross income for statutory depletion purposes (see discussion at note 37 and
related text) cannot be deducted by the lessee in determining his taxable income.
Sunray Oil Co. v. Comm., 147 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1945).
66. Comm. v. Fleix Oil Co., 144 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1944).
67. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1 (e) (1); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
303 U.S. 376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623 (1938).
68. Note 67, supra.
69. U.S. Treas .Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1 (e) (1) provides in part: ".. • If the oil and
gas are not sold on the property but . . . are transported from the property prior to
sale, the gross income from the property shall be assumed to be equivalent to the
representative market or field price. (as of the date of the sale) of the oil and gas
before . . . transportation."
70. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1 (e) (5) ; Quintana Petroleum Co. v. Comm.,
143 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1944). See also discussion at note 37.
71. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1 (g) . ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 102
assumes that in computing net income for this purpose the allocated part of the bonus
excluded from gross income in determining the 272% depeltion allowance is added
back to the gross income from the property before deducting the various expenses
and arriving at the net income. This appears logical particularly if as held in Sunray
Oil Co. v. Comm., 147 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1945) such amount must be included as
part of the taxpayer's gross income in determining his taxable income. However,
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1 (g) specifically provides that "net income" for
the purpose of determining the limitation on statutory depletion means the "gross
income from the property" as defined in paragraph (e) of the same regulation less
specified expenses. Paragraph (e) in turn provides that in determining "gross income from the property" an allocated portion of the bonus previously paid must be
excluded.
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derived by deducting therefrom all operating costs including depreciation
(but not depletion), ad valorem and severance taxes, interest on borrowed
money, 7 2 an allocated part of overhead,73 and intangibles 74 in the event the
taxpayer has elected to expense them. 75 Only those overhead costs attributable to exploration and production must be allocated and in this connection an allocation has to be made as between producing and non-producing properties 76 and among the producing properties. 77 The allocation
of overhead among the producing properties is made on the basis of their
relative production.78
If the taxpayer elects to deduct intangibles as a current expense, as
he ordinarily will, 79 the 50% net income limitation frequently prevents
the taking of statutory depletion in the year in which a well or wells are
drilled on the property. The taxpayer can, however, take cost depletion
for that particular year without prejudicing his right to take statutory
depletion in subsequent years8s
The 50% net income limitation on statutory depletion suggests the
importance of timing and careful selection of the property to be drilled
in planning the drilling program. A taxpayer on the accrual basis who
contracts to have the drilling done for him can to a limited extent control
the time at which the liability for intangibles will be incurred by variations
in the type of drilling contract adopted. Oil and gas wells are generally
drilled under two principal types of contracts: (1) A so-called footage
contract under which the party incurring the drilling obligation agrees to
pay the driller as the hole is being drilled so much per foot of hole drilled.
(2) A contract providing that there is no obligation to the drilling contractor until and unless the hole is drilled to completion or to a specified
lesser depth.8 1 The taxpayer on a cash basis can control the year in which intangibles are incurred to a certain extent by timing his cash expenditures.
The taxpayer can whether on an accrual or cash basis determine the year
in which intangibles will be incurred as an expense by controlling the
beginning and completion dates of the drilling in question.
If the property the taxpayer plans to drill has little or no income during
the current tax year so that the taxpayer will be entitled to a very small
(if any) statutory depletion deduction, the taxpayer should attempt to
incur as much of the intangible drilling and development costs as possible
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

St. Mary's Oil and Gas Co., 42 B.T.A. 270 (1940).
U.S. T reas. Reg. 1II, Sec. 59.2.91m)-I (g).

See inIra 94-97.
Wilshire Oil Co. v .Helvering, 308 U.S. 90, 60 Sup. Ct. 18 (1939).
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -l (g); G.C.M. 22956, 1941-2 CuM. BULL. 103.
U.S. Treas Reg 118, Sec. 39.23(m) -1 (g).

78. Ibid.

79. See inira 96.
80. Because of the concluding sentence of INT. REV. CODE Sec. 114 (b) (3) which provides
thtat the depletion allowance shall in no event be less than it would be without the
provision for statutory depletion.
81. Great Western Petroleum Corp. v. Comm., I T.C. 611 (1943).
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in the current tax year. Similarly if another well has already been drilled
on the property during the current tax year as a result of which the 50%
net income limitation is going to prevent the taking of all or a substantial
part of the 27V2% statutory depletion deduction with respect to this property, the intangibles incurred in drilling the second well should be concentrated to the extent possible in the current tax year. If, on the other
hand, the addition in the current year of intangibles to current expenses
will result in a substantial reduction in the 27V2% statutory depletion
allowance relating to this property because of the 50% net income limitation, as much of the intangibles as possible should be deferred to the
following year when the income from the new well will increase the net
income of the particular property.
It is also advisable in this connection, other factors being equal, to
carefully select the property to be drilled in the light of the tax consequences. If as between two properties previous drilling on one property
during the current tax year has already assured that statutory depletion
will not be available because of the 50% net income limitation whereas
in the absence of additional drilling the 50% net income limitation will
not affect the other property, the drilling should be undertaken on the
first property. As between producing properties generally to the extent
possible the drilling (other factors being equal) should be concentrated
on the properties with substantial net income and limited as to other
producing properties so that 50%, of the net income from each property
82
will equal or exceed 27V2% of the gross income.
A question sometimes arises as to whether a particular type of payment
is a "royalty" with respect to which the recipient can take depletion or
whether it is "delay rental" which is non-depletable income. This problem
is raised in connection with so-called "shut-in royalties" which usually result
from a provision in an oil and gas lease to the effect that if production is
obtained the lessee can retain the lease without producing it (usually because of lack of market) by paying a specified amount to the lessor in lieu
of the royalty that would have otherwise been payable. Although there
are no cases or ruling the usual practice is to regard a "shut-in royalty"
2a
payment as depletable income.s
82. Asume, e.g., that from property A taxpayer will have net income (before deducting
intangibles) of $300,000 whereas from property B he will have net income (before
deducting intangibles) of $150,000 and that the intangible drilling and development
costs relating to a well drilled on either property will amount to $50,000. Assume
further that 2 7 12% of the gross income on property B is $50,000. If the taxpayer
drills two wells on property A (thereby reducing his net income with respect to that
property to $200,000) and one well on property B (thereby reducing his net income
with respect to that property to $100,000) the taxpayer will be able to take the ftll
271/2% on property A and property B. If, on the other hand, two wells had been
drilled on property B and one well drilled on property A he would have been able
to take the full 271/2/ with respect to property A, but as to property B his depletion
deduction would be limited to $25,000 and he will lose the balance ($25,000) of the
271/2% statutory depletion that would have otherwise been available if the drilling
program had been planned properly from a tax standpoint.
82a. Seale, Problems of Depletion in Oil and Gas Leases in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SFC.OND
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 351, 361 (1950).
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A similar problem is presented with respect to minimum royalty payments. A minimum royalty provision usually requires the lessee to pay the
lessor a specified percentage of the gross production ( and in this respect
does not differ from the typical royalty) but in no event less than a stated
minimum. The excess of the minimum payment over the basic royalty
may or may not be recoupable out of subsequent production and may or
may not be a fixed obligation on the part of the lessee.
If the obligation to pay the minimum royalty is a fixed obligationthat is, cannot be avoided by forfeiting the lease-, any excess of the minimum royalty over the actual royalty would appear to be additional consideration for the lease if not recoupable or an advance royalty if recoupables 2b Accordingly such excess payments should be accorded the
same tax treatment for depletion purposes as previously described in connection with bonus payrnents. 82c The recipient of such minimum royalty
payment should take the depletion deduction with respect thereto and in
the event the lease is abandoned without production should restore the
depletion deduction previously taken to income in the year of abandonment. If the excess is recoupable, the regulations specifically provide that
the leessee may deduct the amount of the excess paid from his gross income
either in the year in which such excess is paid or in the year in which the
excess is recouped8sd
A General Counsel's Memorandums 2e relating to an agreement by an
oil and gas lessee to pay the lessor's ad valorem taxes appears to be inconsistent with the foregoing to a limited extent. The General Counsel's
position is that prior to production such payments (at least when they
are not recoupable) even though a fixed obligation cannot be regarded as
depletable royalty income since there is no production against which to
offset them. This opinion overlooks the fact that if the payments are a
fixed obligation on the part of the lessee they constitute additional consideration paid for the lease and as such are bonus income. To the extent
that this aspect of the General Counsel's opinion is extended to minimum
royalty payments it would appear to be inconsistent with the litigated
case.8 2f .
82b. McFaden v. Comm., 2 T.C. 395 (1943). Cf. Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941).
82c. Supra 86-87.
82d. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -10 (e). The taxpayer must, however, make his
election in this respect in his return for the first taxable year ending on or after
December 31, 1939, in which minimum royalties of this type are paid or accrue. A
failure to deduct any such items for the year paid or accrued constitutes an election
to deduct such items in the year in which recouped. The election made is binding
for all subsequent years and the taxpayer must treat all minimum royalties paid of
accrued in subsequent years in the same manner. This election expressly applies
with respect to determining gross income for statutory depletion purposes (U.S. Treas.
Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1(e). Presumably it also applies to determining gross income for the purpose of computing taxable income inasmuch as it is not expressly
limited to determining gross income for statutory depletion purposes and although
incorporated by reference in the provision setting forth the procedure for determining
gross income for statutory depletion purposes it appears in the regulations as a
separate provision.
82e. G.C.M. 26526, 1950-2 CUM. BuLL. 40.
82f. See cases cited in note 82b.
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If the minimum royalty payments are not fixed obligations but can
be avoided by forfeiting the lease, such payments obviously do not constitute additional consideration for the lease. If in this situation they are
not recoupable from subsequent production, they are not advance royalties
and accordingly such payments prior to production should be regarded as
non-depletable income.Sg If in this situation they are recoupable from
production, there is some indication that such payments prior to production will be regarded as non-depletable income 82h although it could be
argued that they are advance royalties and this point has not been clearly
resolved. After production whether the excess is recoupable or not such
excess is additional royalty and as such depletable income at least to the
extent that the total production under the lease is sufficent to pay the
821

minimum royalty.

The conclusion that minimum royalty payments are additional royalty
after production in these circumstances is based on a General Counsel's
Memorandum relating to a lessee's agreement to pay the lessor's ad valorem
taxes.8 2J This opinion took the postition that after production the lessee's
payment of the lessor's ad va'lorem taxes to the extent that income under
the lease is sufficient to pay such taxes represented a readjustment of the
division of the proceeds from production as between the lessee and the
lessor. The same reasoning would appear applicable to minimum royalty
payments. However, presumably to the extent that income from the property is insufficient to pay the minimum royalty after production, the payment of the minimum royalty (if non-recoupable) represents delay rental
and as such non-depletable income.
Whenever statutory or cost depletion is allowed or allowable the taxpayer must reduce his cost basis in the oil or gas property by the greater
of the amount allowed or allowable. If, however, the depletion allowed
exceeds depletion allowable, the taxpayer's basis in the property does not
have to be reduced by such excess if the excess previously allowed did not
result in a tax benefit.88 The taxpayer may take the statutory depletion
deduction even if he has no cost basis in the property or if previous deduc84
tions have eliminated his cost basis entirely.
INTANGIBLE DRILLING AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES

With respect to expenditures incurred in drilling a well the regulations
distinguish between so called "tangible and "intangible" expenditures.
"Tangible" expenditures relate in general to physical items having a salvage
value, whereas "intangibles" relate generally to items having no salvage
82g. G.C.M. 26526, 1950-2 CUM. BULL. 40; Burnett v. Hutchinson Coal Co., 64 F.2d 275

(4th Cir. 1933) cert. denied 290 U.S. 652 (1933).
82h. Burnett v. Hutchison Coal Co., supra note 82g.
82i G.C.M. 26526, 1950-2 CUM. BULL. 40.
83. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 113(b) (1) B so provides with respect to tax years since January
1, 1952 and also with respect to any tax year prior to January 1, 1952 provided an
election is made in accordance with the provisions of INT. REV. CODE Sec. 113 (d).
84. Rowan Drilling Co. v. Comm., 130 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942).
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value. No election with respect to tangible expenditures is provided and
all such expenditures must be capitalized and recovered through depreciation.8 5
With respect to intangible drilling and development expenses the taxpayer can elect to either capitalize them or to write them off as current
In the event the election is made to capitalize such expendiexpenses. 8
tures they must be recovered through the depletion allowance except for
installation costs of physical equipment which are recovered through depreciation.8 7 The election once made is binding for the individual taxpayer
in all subsequent tax years and with respect to all properties.8 8 A taxpayer
who has elected to capitalize intangibles has an additional election as to
whether to write off currently intangibles incurred in drilling a dry hole
or whether to capitalize them.8 9
A corporation, of course, has an election in this respect distinct from
that of its individual stockholders. 90 A trustee of oil and gas properties
91
also has an election as trustee distinct from his election as an individual.
A partnership constitutes a distinct entity for this purpose and should make
a separate election.92 As we note below, development by tenants in common
under an operating agreement may constitute a partnership for this
purpose. 98
It is important that a taxpayer clearly indicate his election to deduct
current intangibles in the first return filed by him after incurring such
expenditures. 94 In the event he fails to clearly elect he will probably be
deemed to have elected to capitalize intangible expenditures. If the taxpayer elected to capitalize such expenditures after initially drilling a productive well, he must in exercising his additional election with respect to
intangibles incurred in the drilling of dry holes clearly make his election
in the first return filed after incurring such expenditures. 5 This election
is also binding with respect to subsequent tax years and as to all properties
9
of the taxpayer. 6
85. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (in) -18. The
intangible drilling and development deduction provisions are found in the regulations
and are not based on express statutory provisions although the deduction has been
recognized for several years. To eliminate any doubt concerning the validity of the
regulations relating to intangibles a joint resolution of Congress was adopted in 1945
approving these regulations. House Concurrent Resolution No. 50, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess.
86. U.S. Treas .Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16 (a) (1) and (c) (1).
87. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16(b) (1) and (2); United States v. DakotaMontana Oil. Co., 288 U.S. 459, 53 Sup. Ct. 435 (1933).
88. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 59.23 (m) -16(d).
89. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16(b) (4).
90. I. T. 3763, 1945 CuM. BuLu. 115.
91. Dye v. Comm., 1942 BTA Memo. Op.
92. I. T. 3713, 1945 CUM. BULL. 178; Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comm., 20 T.C......................
No. 76 (May 29, 1953).
95. Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comm., 20 T. C-.........----------No. 76 (May 29, 1953).
See discussion at infra 129.
94. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 59.25 (m) -16 (d).
95. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.25(m) -16(b) (4).
96. Ibid.
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As a practical matter the option to capitalize or deduct currently intangible drilling and development expenses invariably is elected in favor
of deducting such expenditures currently. In large part this is due to the
fact that if intangibles are capitalized they are (with the exception of
installation costs of physical equipment) recoverable only through the
depletion allowance. Inasmuch as the statutory depletion allowance of
27V ,o of the gross income can be taken regardless of the cost basis of the
oil and gas property involved, nothing is gained by capitalizing the expenditures recoverable through depletion unless such costs if depleted on a
cost depletion basis exceed the amount recoverable by statutory depletion
over the life of the property. 97 If, as is usually the case, statutory depletion
will exceed the amount recoverable through cost depletion with the intangibles capitalized, the failure to deduct intangibles as a current expense
deprives the taxpayer of a substantial part if not all of the tax benefit
he would otherwise derive from such expenditures. 9s

A particular tax-

payer might find it advantageous to capitalize such expenditures with
respect to a particular property, but inasmuch as the election once made is
binding with respect to all of the taxpayer's properties, a taxpayer who
expects to develop additional properties ordinarily finds it advantageous
to deduct such expenditures currently. 99
97. Assume, for example, that intangibles incurred in drilling a well on a lease amount
to $50,000 and that the acquisition cost of the lease was $50,000. Assume an estimated
production attributable to the lease interest of 100,000 bbls. and the lessee's annual
production as 10,000 bbls. producing a gross income of $250,000 to the lessee. If the
intangibles are capitalized, the cost basis of the lease for depletion purposes is
$100,000 and the per unit cost depletion allowance is $1.00 per bbl. (Cost basis ($100,00)
dividt-d by estimated recoverable reserves (100,000 bbls.). The cost depletion allowance
assuming lessee's share of annual production to be 10,000 bbls. is $10,000. Statutory
depletion on the other hand is 27 2 % of $250,000 or $59,750 provided that 50%/ of
the net income from the taxpayer's interest in the property equals or exceeds this
amount. The taxpayer obviously is going to take the statutory depletion allowance
and each year he does so he must reduce his cost basis in the lease by the amount of
the allowance. Accordingly, in two years the cost basis of the lease is going to be
eliminated entirely and the taxpayer will have derived no benefit from the $50,000
added to the cost basis by capitalizing intangibles. If, on the other hand, the taxpayer
deducted intangibles as a current expense he would have had a $50,000 deduction
from ordinary income from other sources (a very substantial tax benefit if he has other
income) and he can take the same statutory depletion allowance that he takes if he
capitalizes intangibles. The foregoing is an oversimplification but is sufficient to
indicate the general advisability of deducting intangibles currently.
98. This statement should be qualified to the extent of noting that if the intangibles
are capitalized and if the property is sold prior to the recovery of the entire basis of
the property through the depletion allowance, the taxpayer will receive some tax
benefit in that to the extent that the cost basis has not been recovered by depletion
it will be deducted from the sales price of the property in determining the taxpayer's
gain on the transaction.
99. The importance of the intangible deduction in providing capital to an oil and gas
operator cannot he overemaphasized. If, for example, the operator drills a well on
producing property and the intangible drilling expenditures relating to the drilling
of the well are $60,000 he can, if he has made the proper election, deduct this amount
from the net income received from that property or any other property or source in
determining his net taxable income. Assuming, for example, that his net taxable
income before deducting intangibles is $100,000 by taking the intangible deduction
the taxpayer in effect received $60,000 of this amount free of taxes and can use this
"tax-free" income to develop additional properties. Similarly, if the drilling results in
a dry-hole the intangibles (and a substantial part of the expenditures involved in
drilling a dry hole are intangibles) can be offset against incotie from other sources.
The taxpayer who capitalizes intangibles can deduct such capitalized costs as an
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What are intangible drilling and development expenses? In general
they are expenses incurred in "drilling of wells and the preparation of wells
for production of oil or gas" which have no salvage value. 100 They include
all expenditures for "wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies," etc., incident
to the drilling of a well and preparing it for production.' 0 ' Geological
expenses directly related to the drilling of and preparing for production a
particular well are within the option, 101 . but geological expenses resulting
from geological activities that led to the acquisition of the particular property must be capitalized as part of the acquisition costs.101b Expenditures
incurred in the construction of derricks, tanks, pipe lines and other physical
structures necessary for the drilling of the well and the preparation of the
well for production are within the option, 0 2 but the cost of the physical
installation themselves must be capitalized and recovered through depreciation.' 03 Accordingly, the cost of items having salvage value such as
pipe, casing, tubing, tanks, engines, boilers, pumps, etc., must be capitalized
04
and recovered through depreciation.
Although the cost of installing physical items having a salvage value
used in connection with the drilling of wells and their preparation for production are subject to the option, the Bureau has taken a narrow view of
what is involved in preparing a well for production and regards a well as
10 5
completed for production when the casing, including the Christmas tree,
06
has been installed.'
Accordingly, the cost of installing oil well pumps,
separators, gathering lines, storage tanks, salt water disposal equipment,
recycling equipment, etc., is not within the option and must be capitalized.' 0 7 On the other hand the cost of installing casing, tubing, the Christordinary loss in the year in which the property is abandoned. However, in order to
take the loss deduction the entire property must be abandoned . See infra 118-119.
Accordingly, the taxpayer cannot deduct such costs as individual dry holes are
drilled (in the absence of abandoning the entire property) as he can in effect do by
electing to deduct intangibles as current expenses. One informed tax writer has
observed that the intangible drilling and development deduction is more important
to the oil and gas operator than the more widely publicized statutory depletion allowance. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 21-22.
100. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16 (a) (1).
101. Ibid.
101a. Ibid.
10lb. I.T. 4006, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 48.
102. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (in) -16 (a) (I).
103. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-16(c) (1).
104. Ibid.
105. As near as the author, who is not versed in the art of petroleum engineering, has
been able to determine the "Christmas tree" is a group of valves that control the
flow of production from the well and are installed on a producing well after the
casing and tubing, but prior to the installation of the pump.
106. Mim. 6754, 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 30.
107. Mim. 6754, supra note 106, specifically provides that none of the installation costs
of the following are within the option: (1) Oil well pumps (upon initial completion
of the well), including the necessary housing structures. (2) Oil well pumps (after
the well has flowed for a time), including the necessary housing structures.
(3) Oil well separators, including the necessary housing structures.
(4)
Pipelines from the well head to oil storage tanks on the producing lease. (5) Oil
storage tanks on the producing lease. (6) Salt water disposal equipment, including
any necessary pipelines. (7) Pipelines from the mouth of a gas well to the first
point of control, such as common carrier pipeline, natural gasoline plant, or carbon
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mas tree, derricks and other physical equipment installed before the Christmas tree can be deducted as intangibles. 10s
A taxpayer on an accrual basis can deduct intangibles only in the year
in which they are incurred which may or may not coincide with the year in
which the well is completed.' 0 9 Expenditures incurred in operating the
0
However,
wells are not, of course, within the intangible deduction.1
the hole
reworking
or
hole
the
intangible expenses incurred in deepening
stimulof
the
purpose
for
are subject to the option."' Input wells drilled
to
which
well
ating oil production are treated as if they were part of the oil
2
they relate."1 However, wells drilled to dispose of salt water are not,
according to the Internal Revenue Service, incident to production and are
not within the option." 3
A taxpayer who incurs intangible expenses subject to the option can
take the deduction regardless of whether he uses his own equipment and
employees to drill the well or whether he contracts to have the well
drilled."X4 Accordingly, under current regulation a taxpayer who contracts with a drilling contractor for the drilling of a well under a "turnkey"
7
8
contract'" or on a footage basis" 6 can take the intangible deduction." If
a well is drilled under a "turnkey" contract a breakdown should be made
by the taxpayer with respect to the portion of the contract price attributable to intangibles and the portion attributable to tangibles otherwise
the Commissioner may make an allocation on an arbitrary percentage
basis."18 The contract can specify the respective costs of tangibles and in-

108.
109.
110.
111.

black plant. (8) Recycling equipment, including any necessary pipelines. (9) Pipelines from oil storage tanks on the producing leasehold to a common carrier pipeline.
Mim. 6754, 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 30.
Great Western Petroleum Corp. v. Comm., 1 T. C. 624 (1943)
U.S. Treas. Reg. 119, Sec. S9.23 (m) -16 (c) (2).
Consolidated Mutual Oil Co., 2 B.T.A. 1067 (1925); Monrovia Oil Co., 28 B.T.A.

335 (1933).

112. Page Oil Co., 41 B.T.A. 952 (1940) held that the taxpayer could not capitalize and
recover through depreciation the cost of water wells drilled for the purpose of
stimulating production and that the cost of the drilling of such wells should be
considered as development costs recoverable only through the depletion allowance
and, therefore, presumably (although the Board did not decide this particular
point) subject to the option relating to intangible drilling and development costs.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16 specifically provides that labor, supplies, etc.
used in shooting a well are within the option. Since the primary function of an oil
pump is to stimulate production it appears to this author that the installation costs
of art oil pump are "incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the
preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas" in the same sense that shooting
the well or drilling input wells is. However, as noted in the discussion at note 107
the position of the Internal Revenue Service is otherwise.
113. Mim. 6754, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 30.
114. This is true with respect to intangibles incurred for tax years subsequent to December 31, 1942. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m) -16(a) (1).
115. A "turnkey" contract is one under which the contractor agrees to drill a well to
completion for a specified contract price. Prior to the change in the appropriate
regulation in 1942 a taxpayer could not deduct intangibles if the well was drilled
prusuant to a turnkey contract. J. K. Hughes Oil Co. v. Bass, 62 F.2d 176 (5th
Cir. 1932).
116. A "footage" contract is one under which the contractor agrees to drill the well
for a specified price per foot of hole drilled.
117. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16(a) (1).
118. See, e.g., Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312, 55 Sup. Ct. 174 (1934).
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tangibles; in lieu thereof a common method of allocating such costs is to
value the cost of the tangible equipment (based ordinarily on what the
contractor paid for such equipment) and regard the remainder of the
consideration as intangible drilling and development costs. 1 19 However,
in this connection with respect to any equipment beyond the Christmas
tree the value thereof must include not only the cost of the equipment but
120
the cost of installing -it as well.
Who can take the option? The Regulation provides that the option
can be taken by an operator, defined as "one who holds a working or
operating interest in any tract or parcel of land either as a fee owner or
under a lease or any other form of contract granting working or operating
rights."' 2' However, the deduction can be taken by an "operator" only
to the extent such expenses are "incurred by" him 22 and only to the extent
his fractional part of the operating rights bears to the total operating
rights. 123 Thus if the taxpayer owns 50%, of the lease but pays only 25%
of the drilling costs of a welt drilled on the lease he can take only 25% of
the intangibles as a deduction and can capitalize only 25% of the depreciable expenditures. 24 If, on the other hand, the taxpayer who owns 50%
of the lease (operating rights) pays the entire drilling costs, he can deduct
only 50% of such charges with respect to intangibles and capitalize only
50%, of the depreciable expenditures. 12 5 If, as is usuualy the case in this
type of situation, the expenditures are made in return for an interest in
the lease, all such expenditures in excess of the amount attributable to
the fractional share acquired by the taxpayer must be regarded as part of
the acquisition costs and recovered through the depletion allowance.' 2 6
The Tax Court recently held in the Platt case 127 that an investor who
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.

ANDERSON, Op. Cit.supra note

1,at 55, 58.

U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-16(c) (1); Mim. 6754, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 30.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m)-16 (a) (1).
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m) -16(a) (1), Platt v. Comm., 18 T. C. 1229 (1952).
U.S. Treas. Reg 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16 (a) (1); Ortiz Oil Co. v. Comm., 102 F.2d 508
(5th Cir. 1939).
In the Ortiz case, supra note 123, the taxpayer was engaged among other things in
the business of drilling oil wells and drilled the well in question on a lease in which
it had a half-interest under a trunkey agreement with the owners of the other half
interest to drill the well for a specified contract sum. Inasmuch as the other interest
owners paid more than their proportionate share of the drilling costs the taxpayer
was permitted to deduct as intangibles only. the amount acttally paid by the taxpayer. The excess of the amount the other interest owners paid over their proportionate share of the drillirng costs, the court regarded as income to the taxpayer.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m)-16 (a) (1), Platt v. Comm., 18 T. C. 1229 (1952).
Under the current regulation
U.S. Treas.2 Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m) -16 (a) (1).
,,hethey the inttrest is asigned before or after the comptetrtx of the dritting is of no
consequence.
18 T. C. 1229 (1952). U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (in) -16 (a) (1) as amended in
1942 specifically provides that "... in any case where any drilling or development project is undertaken for the grant or assignment of a fraction of the operating rights,
only that part of the costs thereof which is attributable to such fractional interest is
within this option." Prior to the amendment of this regulation all such costs had to
be capitalized as part of the acquisition costs of the lease. Berkshire Oil Co. v.
Comm., 9 T. C. (1947). When a taxpayer acquires an interest in oil and gas acreage
in return for drilling a well on the acreage his expenditures in part represent the
cost of the lease interest and in part his proportionate share of the well costs. It is
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acquires a fractional undivided interest in a lease and a well being drilled
thereon could not under the factual situation there involved deduct any
part of the investment as intangible drilling and development expenses.
The operator-promoter who sold the interests contracted to drill the well to
a specific depth but apparently did not represent that the proceeds would
be used in their entirety for this purpose. The Tax Court held that even
assuming that the promoter-operator contracted to use the proceeds to drill
the well and did in fact use the proceeds in the drilling of the well, the
taxpayer-investor could not deduct a proportionate part of the intangibles
and must capitalize the entire investment as the acquisition cost of his
interest in the lease and recover same through the depletion allowance.
Three possible alternatives are suggested by the Platt case to avoid the
impact of that decision. First, it is clear that if the taxpayer-investor purchases an interest in a lease and is then assessed for his proportionate part
of the drilling costs that he can deduct intangibles and capitalize depreciables to the extent of the assessmfient. 128 Second, if the promoter-operator
acts as the taxpayer-investors agent in arranging for the drilling of the
well, the taxpayer-investor can deduct intangibles and capitalize depreciables. 12 9 This suggests using language of agency in the operating agreement and presumably precludes the operator from taking any secret profits
in connection with the transaction. 130 Third, the same tax results may
possibly be accomplished by segregating in the contract of sale that portion
of the contract price that represents the cost of the interest in the lease and
that portion which represents the investor's contribution to the drilling
cost of the well. Although the Platt case did not directly hold that under
these circumstances the taxpayer-investor could deduct intangibles with
virtually imposible to accurately allocate such costs between the lease interest and
the well interest. The regulation now provides a practical tnethod of making such
allocation by permitting the taxpayer to deduct that portion of intangibles paid by
him to the extent of his interest in the lease. Essentially the same problem is
presented when an investor buys an interest in a lease arid the proceeds of his
investment are to be used in drilling a well. Part of his investment represents the
cost of the lease interest he acquires and part represents his share of the costs of the
drilling. Accordingly, he should be permitted to deduct as intangibles that part
of such costs attributable to his fractional interest. If, for example, he acquires
one/one-hundredth interest in the operating rights and pays $2,000 for such interest
asuming that intangibles incurred total $100,000 he should be permitted to deduct
$1,000 as his proportionate part of the intangibles and required to capitalize as
acquisition costs the balance of his investment. However, the Tax Court in the
Platt case rejected this argument primarily because the taxpayer did not agree
to do the drilling in exchange for an interest in the lease and the drilling was not
done by him directly or by contact or through an agent. If the taxpayer had overcome this barrier, the Tax Court makes clear that he would then have to make an
adequate showing of the fact that no more than his fractiopal share of the cost is
included in the option deduction.
128. ". . . On the accepted ground that the assessment of $2,800 paid by petitioner
represented an expenditure for intangible drilling costs, for his account, the respondent concedes his rights to expense such costs under the option granted in
Section 29.23 (m) -16 (b) of Regulations Ill." Letter of Chief Counsel of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue dated June 24, 1952 quoted in Platt v. Comm., supra note 127,
at 1231.
See also W. D. Atnbrose, 42 B.T.A. 1405
129. Platt v. Comm., 18 T.C. 1229 (1952).
(1940), aff'd 127 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1942).
130. An agent cannot take secret profits. RsrATEMENT OF AGENCY (1933) Secs. 388-389.
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respect to that portion of the contract price representing his contribution
to the drilling costs, it carefully distinguished this situation from the facts
there involved.' 13
Inasmuch as only one who owns an operating interest can deduct intangibles it is apparent that royalty (landowner's and overriding) owners
cannot take the deduction nor can the owner of a net profit interest or of
an oil payment.' 3 2 A participating interest owner is also precluded from
taking the deduction inasmuch as typically such interests merely entitle
the owner to a specified percentage of the production after deduction of
part of the operating costs without giving him operating rights.'3 3 Under
current regulations a driller who drills a well in exchange for an interest
in the operating rights can deduct that part of intangibles and capitalize
that part of depreciables that are attributable to the fractional interest he
acquires for drilling the well.' 34 However, if the taxpayer drills a well in
exchange for an oil payment he must capitalize all of the drilling costs as
the acquisition cost of the oil payment and receover such costs through
depletion inasmuch as he has not acquired operating rights and is not,
35
therefore, an "operator" within the definition of the Regulations.
The promoter-operator selling oil and gas interests to finance the
drilling of oil and gas wells must be in a position to establish that he was
committed to use the money received from investors and did use it in the
drilling of the particular well in which they invested.'3 6 To the extent
that the money was not so used and to the extent that the taxpayer is
unable to sustain the burden of proof in this respect monies received by
him from the investors must be regarded as "income". 3 7 If, on the other
131.

132.
133.

134.
135.
136.
137.

18 T. C. 1229, 1233 (1952). In addition to the three suggestions cited in the text,
it the interest owners constitute a joint venture or partnership the joint-venture or
partnership could take a deduction for intangibles. it is not clear, however, as to
what type of arrangement resulis in creating a partnership or joint-venture. See
Fischer v. Comm., 14 T.C. 792 (1940). Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comm., 20 T.C...
No. 76 (May 29, 1953). In the event the interest holders desire to be regarded as a
joint-venture or partnership, they should file a partnership return of income pertaining to the lease in question. Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comm., supra. However.
being regarded as a partnership or joint-venture may have some undesirable non-tax
consequences.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16 (a) (1).
See, for example, the interests involved in Transcalifornia Oil Co. Ltd., 37 B.T.A.
119 (1938). However, as a practical matter there is little if any difference between
such interests and an interest in a lease accompanied by an agreement giving the
operator irrevocable agency authority to operate and develop the lease. Accordingly,
although Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-16 (a) (1) defines operating rights to include "a
leasehold interest" it is conceivable that in this situation the Commissioner may contend that the owner of the lease interest is not an "operator" within the meaning of
the Regulation.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, See. 39.23 (m) -16 (a) (1).
Rowan Drilling Co. v. Comm., 130 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
Sec. 39.23 (m) -16 (a) (1).
Transcalifornia Oil Co. Ltd. v. Comm., 37 B.T.A. 119 (1938).
Rogan v. Blue Ridge Oil Co., 83 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1936); U. S. v. Knox-Powell
Stockton Co., 83 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1936); Thompson v. Comm., 28 F.2d 247 (1928);
Rawco Inc., 37 B.T.A. 128 (1938). Although the cases have generally regarded such
monies as "income" presumably on the theory that it represents the promoters profit
on the drilling operations, conceivably in some situations all or part of the proceeds
represent the gain on the sale of an interest in the property in which event the
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hand, the operator can establish that the proceeds from the sale of the oil
payment 18 8 or other oil and gas interests are pledged for use in development they are regarded as a reduction in the development costs of the
operator rather than as income. 13 9 Accordingly, the promoter-operator can
take intangibles and can capitalize depreciables only to the extent that
the total costs incurred in drilling the well exceeds the amount realized
from investors.' 40 It is readily apparent that an arrangement of this type
is undesirable in that no one is permitted to take a deduction for part of
the intangibles or recover part of the depreciables through the depreciation
allowance-the investor is unable to do so because of the Platt case 14 ' and
the promoter-operator is unable to do so because of the foregoing prin142
ciples.
Regulation 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16 provides that intangible drilling and
development costs "include the cost to operators of any drilling or development work (excluding amounts payable only out of production . . .) done
for them by contractors under any form of contract, including turnkey
contracts." The exclusion noted apparently prevents an operator from
deducting intangibles when they are paid for by an oil payment and this is
the position of the Internal Revenue Service.' 43 This exclusion would also
appear to apply to a "carried interest"'144 with respect to the carried party's
right to deduct intangibles in that they are "payable only out of production....
" However, three circuit court decisions, 145 the most recent of
which is Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. J. S. Abercrombie Co., 162
F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947), have led a number of commentators to believe
that the carried party can deduct his proportionate share of the intangibles.' 4 6 In all three cases the court held that the carried party must
report as taxable income his proportionate share of the proceeds from production used to reimburse the carrying party in the year which earned
despite the fact that the carried party did not actually receive such proceeds.
Only the Harris case,1 47 expressly dealt with the question of deductibility
gain may be a capital gain. Cf. Vern W. Bailey, 21 T.C-......
No. 76 (Feb. 9, 1954).
As to determination of the holding period with respect to such sales see infra 111-112.
Note also in connection with this problem the discussion of Ortiz Oil Co. v. Comm.,
192 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939) at note 124.
138. G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 66; I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 10.
139. Transcalifornia Oil Co., 37 B.T.A. 119 (1938).
But cf. Ortiz Oil Co. v. Comm.,
102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939) discussed at note 124.

140. Ortiz Oil Co. v. Comm., 102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939); Transcalifornia Oil Co. v.
Comm., 37 B.T.A. 119 (1938).
141. 18 T.C. 1299 (1952).
142. See supra 100-101 as to suggestions for avoiding the impact of the Platt case.
14. f.C.M. 22'15, 1941-1 Cum. , i . 214. l-owe-yer, in I Rudman,, , B.T.A. 9, (I9M)
intangibles payable out of oil were allowed as a deduction.
144. A "carried interest" situation usually involves an agreement under which one interest
holder agrees to finance the drilling of a well and is to recover the other interest
holder's proportionate sbare of the drilling costs out of production. The party
finacing the drilling is the "carrying party" and the party whose proportionate
share of the costs are to be paid out of production is the "carried party".
145. Comm. v. Abercrombie, 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947); Reynolds v. McMurray, 60 F.2d
843 (10th Cir. 1932); T. K. Harris Co. v. Comm., 112 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1940).
146. Jackson, Tax Planning Before Drilling, XXVII TULANE L. REV. 21, 35-38 (1952).
147. T. K. Harris Co .v. Comm., 112 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1940).
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of intangibles holding in this regard that the carried party could not deduct
intangibles because the contract constituted a turnkey drilling contract.
The Regulations have been changed since the decision in the Harris case to
permit deduction of intangibles incurred under a "turnkey" drilling contract147a and accordingly it can be argued that the Harris case is authority
for the proposition that the carried party can deduct intangibles. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the carried party is taxed on that
part of his share of the proceeds used to reimburse the carrying party for
the carried party's share of the intangible drilling costs and, therefore,
can be said to have incurred such intangible drilling and development
costs. 1 47b Further the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Abercrombie
case 1 4s regarded "the economic reality of the transaction" as a mortgage
by the carried party to the carrying which suggests that the carried party
can deduct intangibles in the same manner as one who has financed his
share of the drilling costs by borrowing the money and pledging his interest
in the production as security. The carrying party, on the other hand, under
the rationale of the Abercrombie decision can deduct intangibles and
capitalize depreciables only to the extent of his interest in the lease since
as to the balance he is merely in the position of a secured creditor. Assuming that the carried party can deduct a proportionate share of the intangibles
he probably cannot do so until his interest in the lease has earned income
used to reimburse the carrying party in that until that time the obligation
14 9
to pay such costs is merely a contingent one.
To avoid the impact of the Abercrombie decision, which results in the
party incurring the drilling expenses being limited to only a proportionate
part of the intangibles and depreciables and on the other hand results in
the imposition of a tax on the carried party for income he never receives,
the following alternatives have been suggested:
(1) The assignor can assign the entire lease and reserve an override.
(2) The assignor can assign the entire lease and reserve a net profit
interest. The net profit interest can, if the parties so agree, provide that
the assignor is to be paid a specified percentage of the net profits after the
operator has been reimbursed for drilling and operating costs.
(3) The assignor can assign the entire lease with a provision in the
lease to the effect that when sufficient income has been accumulated to
reimburse the assignee for one-half of the drilling costs, one-half of the
lease is to revert back to the assignor.
As to suggestion (1) it is dear that the assignee owns all the operating
rights and hence can take all of the intangibles as a deduction. 150 As to
147a. Supra 98.
147b. The weakness of this argument, however, is that under U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec.
39.23 (m) -16 the fact that an operator incurred such costs does not entitle him to
take the intangible deduction if such costs are payable solely out of production.
148. 162 F.2d 338, at 340 (1947).
149. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 23 B.T.A. 829 (1931).
150. Kay Kimball, 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940).
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suggestion (2) it is generally assumed 151 that the assignor reserving a net
profit interest cannot deduct intangibles and cannot capitalize any part of
depreciables and that the entire deduction is taken by the assignee-operator. 15 2 The cases cited in support of this proposition are not directly in
point in that they relate to the question of whether a net profit interest is
an economic interest in oil and gas in place and as to whether an assignment of a lease with a reserved net profit interest constitutes a sale or a
sublease. 153 However, in concluding that a net profit interest is an "economic interest" the courts held that the owner of the net profit interest
could take depletion with respect to and was taxable on only the net amount
received.' 54 It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the assigneeoperator who is taxed on that part of the proceeds that represents reimbursement to him for expenses incurred in drilling the well has incurred
such expenses and is entitled to take intangibles and to capitalize depreciables with respect thereto. In this regard, however, in drafting the net
profit interest, care should be taken to grant all the operating rights to
the operator and to reserve only an interest in the net profit as distinguished
from an interest in the property; the court in the Abercrombie case regarded its decision as "controlled by the fundamental principle that income is
taxable to the owner of the property producing the same. ....155
As to suggestion (3) some tax writers 156 are of the opinion that this
arrangement avoids the consequences of the Abercrombie decision. This
view is based in part on the fact that although the Internal Revenue Service
has now acquiesced in the Abercrombie decision 157 after initially refusing
to do so, 158 the Internal Revenue Service has never withdrawn G.C.M.
227301o9 which is in several respects inconsistent with the Abercrombie
rationale and implications.' 60 The Internal Revenue Service, therefore,
can be expected to limit the Abercrombie decision to its particular facts
and to distinguish situations similar to suggestion (3). However, in some
situations it is advantageous to a particular taxpayer to follow Abercrombie
and accordingly it is not unlikely that the Commissioner will be challenged
151. See, e.g., Jackson, Tax Planning Before Drilling, XXVII

TVLANE L. REV. 21, 39

(1952).

152. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 CUM. BuLL. 214.
153. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Comm., 328 U.S. 25, 66 Sup. Ct. 861 (1946); Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm., 326 U.S. 599, 66 Sup. Ct. 409 (1946).
154. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Comm., supra note 153; Kirby Petroluem Co. v. Comm.,
supranote 153; Helvering v. Mt. Producers Corp. 303 U.S. 376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623 (1938);
Comm. v. Felix Oil Co., 144 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1944).
One disadvantage to the holder
155. Comm. v. Abercrombie, 162 F.2d 338, 340 (1947).
of the net profit interest as compared to the working interest in this situation is
that the working interest owner can take statutory depletion as to the gross income
attiibxtable to his itemet wheve-as the net p soRt intesat ovne.r can tavke depletion
only with respect to the net income received by him. Comm. v. Felix Oil Co., 144
F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1944).
156. See e.g., Jackson, Tax Planning Before Drilling, XXVII TULANE L. REv. 21, 37-38
(1952). For a contrasting view see Bergen, Oil and Taxes-Some Problems and Proposals, 26 So. CALIF. L. REv. 396. 409 (1953).
157.

1949-1 CUM. BuLL. 1.

158. 1946-2 CuM. BuLL.6.
159. 1941-1 CUM. BuLL 214.
160. Ibid.
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in the courts in this regard as he was in the Abercrombie case. Accordingly,
the taxpayer who wants to avoid Abercrombie would be well advised to
rely on either suggestions (1) or (2) rather than suggestion (3) until the
matter is clarified.
DEPRECIATION

The previous discussion relating to intangibles and to acquisition costs
of oil and gas properties has necessarily referred in many instances to the
depreciation allowance.' 61 As previously noted intangible drilling and
development costs cannot be recovered through depreciation, but if capital16 2
On the other
ized must be recovered through the depletion allowance.
hand all expenditures involved in drilling a well representing the cost of
tangible physical items must be capitalized and recovered through the
depreciation allowance.' 63 In addition all installation costs of tangible
physical equipment after the installation of the Christmas tree must be
64
If the taxpayer elects
capitalized ana recovered through depreciation.'
and
to capitalize intangibles, the cost of installing physical items up to 65
including the Christmas tree, are also recovered through depreciation.
The individual physical items involved in the drilling of a well, the
preparation of a well for production and in producing a well can be
capitalized separately and depreciation recovered with respect to each
individual item. 166 Bulletin "F" sets forth the normal life expectancy of
various items used in different phases of drilling and production; 6 7 however, the taxpayer can if supported be adequate experience of his own or of
other operators use different life expectancies.' 68 The individual item
method as such is seldom used because of the bookkeeping detail involved
and because no gain or loss can be taken when the individual items are
retired unless the taxpayer has used the maximum expected life rather
than the estimated average life in determining depreciation.' 69
Ordinarily with respect to oil and gas properties taxpayers use a group
or composite basis in computing depreciation. Under this method the
cost of all items in the group are included in a composite account and a
single average life expectancy for the items as a group is used in computing
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Supra 97-98.
Supra 96.
Supra 94-95.
Supra 97-98.
Supra 97.
Mim. 4170 (rev.), XV-2 CM. BULL. 148 (1936).
Bulletin "F" provides the following typical lifeexpectancies with respect to oil and
gas equipment: Steel Drilling Derricks-10 years; Rotary Drilling Machine-8 years;
Casing-20 years; Steel Pumping Derricks-20 years; Shackle Rods-10 years; Sucker
Rods-3 years; Pumping Units (Electrical) -20 years; Separators-15 years; Tanks20 years; Tubing and Packers-10 years.
168. Bulletin "F" (Revised Jan. 9, 1942) p. 3.
169. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118. Sec. 29-23 (e) -3 (discussed at infra 120); Bulletin "F",
pp. 7-8; McGowen, The Allowance for Depreciation and the Federal Income Tax
Treatment of Depreciable Properties in the Oil and Gas Industry, in PROCFEDINGS
OF THE THID ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 303, 324-325
(1952).
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depreciation. Inasmuch as depletion must be computed separately for
each "property"' 17 0 and the computation of statutory depletion necessitates
a determination of the depreciation charges relating to each property, it is
ordinarily convenient to regard the depreciable equipment on each separate
property as one composite account for depreciation purposes. If the unit of
production method of computing depreciation is used, grouping by individual properties ordinarily must be employed inasmuch as estimated
reserves can generally be determined only with respect to the entire property.
Any taxpayer having an investment in depreciable equipment can take
a deduction for depreciation. 17' Ordinarily the owner of the landowner's
royalty, overriding royalty, oil payment, and a true net profit interest cannot take any deduction for depreciation."7 2 However, the taxpayer having
an interest in a lease and the equipment located thereon can take deprecia173
In
tion provided he has an investment (cost basis) in such equipment.
174
it would appear that the
view of the rationale of the Abercrombie case
owner of a carried working interest is entitled to capitalize and recover
through depreciation his proportionate share of the expenditures for depreciable items. 175 The taxpayer who drills a well in return for an interest
in the lease can capitalize and recover through depreciation only that portion of expenditures on depreciables that is attributable to the interest
176
he will acquire in the lease.
The taxpayer can use any accepted method of computing depreciation. 78 However, once he adopts a particular method he can change to
another only with the approval of the Commissioner. 79 The two commonly used methods of computing depreciation with respect to oil and gas
properties are the straight line method and the unit of production method.
Under the straight line iethod Lhe depreciation allo'ance i%determined
by dividing the cost basis of the equipment less the estimated salvage value
170. Supra 89. If the composite or group method is employed upon the normal
retirement of an asset included in the group its cost should be eliminated from
the cost basis in determining the depreciation deduction in subsequent years. U. S.
Industrial Alcohol Co. v, Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2nd Cir. 1943). If, however, an
individual item in the group account is discarded prematurely so that a loss deduction can be taken (see infra 121-122) the life expectancy of the individual item
rather than the group is used in determining the loss. Ibid.
171. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-18 provides as follows, "Taxpayers operating
oil or gas properties will, in addition to and apart from the deduction allowable
for depletion as hereinbefore provided, be permitted to deduct a reasonable allowance
for depreciation of physical property such as machinery, tools, equipment, pipes, etc.,
so far as not in conflict with the option exercised by the taxpayer under Sec. 39.23
(m) -16 ... " G.C.M. 22332, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 228, Herndon Drilling Co. v. Comm.,
ra T. C. 6216 (1946).
172. Comm. v. Rowan Drilling Co., 130 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942); fierndon Drilling Co. v.
Comm., supra note 171; G.C.M. 22332, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 228.
173. Notes 171 and 172 supra.
174. Discussed supra 102-103.
175. However, he may not be able to take such deduction until part or all of his share
of the cost of the depreciables has been recovered by the carrying party. Sunburst
Oil and Refining Co., 23 B.T.A. 829 (1931).
176. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -16 (a) (1).
178. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, See. 39.23 (1) -5
179. Bulletin "F" (Revised jan. 2, 1942) 4, 87.

A

GUIDE TO FEDERAL OIL AND GAS INCOME TAXATION

by its estimated useful life. In this respect Bulletin "F" estimates the
useful life of lease and well equipment as a group as twenty years. 80° However, if the economic life of the property is less than the life expectancy of
the equipment the economic life of the oil and gas deposit may be used
as the life expectancy of the equipment.' 8 '
Under the unit of production method the cost basis of the equipment
less the estimated salvage value is divided by the total estimated number of
barrels of oil (or thousand cubic feet of gas) that can be recovered from
the property. The resulting figure is multiplied by the number of barrels
(or thousand cubic feet of gas) produced during the tax year in order to
determine the depreciation deduction.' 8 2 Although the Commissioner has
attacked the use of the unit of production method on several occasions, its
use has generally been sustained by the courts.' 8 3 The Board of Tax
Appeals in one case indicated that it is a proper method only when the
useful life of the equipment does not exceed the probable life of the resource.' 8 4 However, the same case found that the unit of production
method was a reasonable method of computing depreciation where as there
the taxpayer's equipment would upon exhaustion of the field have a salvage value of 107o.185 On the other hand Bulletin "F" provides that this
method is not acceptable if the property has reserves "sufficient to extend
operations beyond the physical life of the original plant."' 8 6
CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

As is well known net long term capital gains result in a taxpayer,
whether an individual or corporation, incurring a tax that cannot exceed
26% of the net long term gain.' 8 7 A long term capital gain results from the
sale of a capital asset that has been held longer than six months.' 8 8 Long
term capital losses and net short term capital losses can be offset against
long term capital gains and in the case of an individual against $1,000 of
ordinary income.' 8 9 To the extent not so used such losses can be carried
over for five subsequent years as short-term losses and offset against subsequent capital gains and in the case of an individual against $1,000 of
ordinary income in each of the five years.' 9 0 Because of the 260 o tax
180. Ibid.
181. U.S. Treas. Rtg. 118 Sec. 39.23 (m) -18. However ,in this regard the taxpayer must
establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the life expectancy of the resource is less than the life expectancy of the equipment.
182. The method is identical to the method used in computing cost depletion except
a different cost basis is used. See supra 89 for discussion of cost depletion.
183. Golconda Oil Co., 7 B.T.A. 955 (1927); W. T. & M. Co., 11 B.T.A. 722 (1928);
Rainbow Gasoline Corp., 31 B.T.A. 1050 (1935); Majestic Oil Corp., 42 B.T.A. 659

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

189.
190.

(1940). U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec.39.23 (1)-5(a) appears to expressly permit the
use of the unit of production method of depreciation generally.
Edwin H. Brady, 7 B.T.A. 818 (1927).
Ibid.
Bulletin "F" (Revised 1042).
INT. REV. CODE Sec. 117(c).
Unless Congress provides otherwise the long-term
capital gain tax maximum will be reduced 25% on April 1, 1954. See note 6.
INT. REV. CODE Sec. 117(a) (4).
INT. REV. CODE Sec. 117(d).
TNT. REV. CODE Sec. 117(e).
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limitation on long term gains and the 50% deduction allowed with respect
to the excess of net long term gains over net short term losses, 19 1 it
is always advantageous to taxpayers for a transaction to result in a gain
taxed as a long term capital gain rather than as ordinary income. On the
other hand because of the limitations noted with respect to deducting
capital losses, it is ordinarily desirable for losses to be incurred as ordinary
losses.
There can be no capital gain or loss unless the property involved is a
capital asset and unless there is a sale. 192 Whether a particular transaction
involves a sale with respect to oil and gas properties has been the subject
of considerable litigation. A number of transactions that would appear to
involve a sale are for tax purposes deemed to be a sublease or lease rather
than a sale. With respect to such transactions any consideration paid in
connection with the transaction is considered an advance royalty subject
to taxation as ordinary depletable income. 19s
If the "vendor" reserves an economic interest in the oil or gas which
interest will continue during the productive life of the property the transaction is a lease or sublease and not a sale.' 9 4 Accordingly, if the fee owner
receives a cash consideration for executing an oil and gas lease in which he
reserves a royalty' 95 or if an oil and gas lessee assigns his lease for a cash
consideration reserving an override' 9 6 or a net profit interest 19 7 no sale
is involved and the consideration received by the taxpayer is taxed as
ordinary depletable income. If, on the other hand, the taxpayer reserves
an oil payment and no other interest, the transaction involves a sale subject
to capital gain treatment (other requirements thereof being present) in
that the taxpayer has not reserved an economic interest that will continue
during the entire life of the lease.1" However, if the taxpayer reseVes an
override and an oil payment, he has reserved an economic interest which
will continue during the productive life of the property and the entire
transaction is considered a sub-leasing transaction and the cash consideration taxed as ordinary depletable income. 199
The taxpayer must not only retain an economic interest that will
continue during the productive life of the property, but it must be in the
nature of a "royalty" or comparable interest against which the cash payINT. REV. CODE Sec. 117.
192. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 117; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 74 (1932).
193. Herring v. Comm., 293 U.S. 322, 55 Sup. Ct. 179 (1934).
194. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm., 326 U.S. 599, 66 Sup. Ct. 409 (1946).
195. Herring v. Comm., 293 U.S. 322, 55 Sup. Ct. 179 (1934) ; Burflet v. Harmel, 287 U.S.
103, 53 Sup. Ct. 74 (1932) ; Berg v. Comm., 33 F.2d 641 (DC-Cir. 1929) G.C.M. 22730,
1941-1 CUM. BuLt. 214.
196. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 Sup. Ct. 225 (1933); G.C.M. 27322, 1952-2 CUM.
BULL.. 62.
197. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm., 326 U.S. 599, 66 Sup. Ct. 409 (1946).
198. Hammonds v. Comm., 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939); Comm. v. Fleming, 82 F.2d
324 (5th Cir. 1936); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 214.
199. Palmer v Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 Sup. Ct. 225 (1933).
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ment may be treated as an advance. 200 If the taxpayer sells all or a part
of a royalty, 201 of a lease,,20 2 of a net profit interest.20 5 of an oil paypayment 20 4 or of a participating interest,205 the transaction involves a sale
rather than a lease or sublease in that even if the taxpayer retains a part of
his original interest any income accruing thereunder results from his
ownership of such interest and not from "royalty" or other comparable
payments created as a result of the conveyance. 206 A conveyance of an
undivided part of the mineral rights would also fall within the foregoing
classification and as such involve a sale; however, if the grantee of such
rights obligates himself to drill a well or wells the transaction has many of
the characteristics of an oil and gas lease and the court may find that the
20 7
transaction is in substance a lease rather than a sale of the minerals.
An oil payment is frequently created as the result of an assignment of a
lease in which the assignor reserves a specified oil payment. However, in
some instances the lessee (or royalty owner) creates an oil payment by
retaining his original lease (or royalty) and carving out of it for the benefit
of his grantee a specified oil payment. The sale of a carved out oil payment
as distinguished from a retained oil payment is regarded by the Internal
Revenue Service as the assignment of future income and as such the consideration received by the vendor is taxed as ordinary depletable income
rather than as a gain (or loss) from the sale of a capital asset.20 8 If the
200. Bankers Mortgage Co. v. Comm., 1 T.C. 698 aff'd 141 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1944) cert.
denied 323 U.S. 727.
201. R. R. Ratliff, 36 B.T.A. 762 (1937); G.C.M. 12118, XII-2 CUM. BULL. 119 (1933);
I. T. 3693, 1944 CUM. BULL. 272.
202. Badger Oil Co. v. Comir., 118 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1941); Berry Oil Ca. v. U.S., 25 F.
Supp. 97 (Ct. Cl. 1939) cert. denied 307 U.S. 634 (1939); Roy H. Laird, 35 B.T.A. 75
(1936); Tex-Penn Oil Co., 28 B.T.A. 917 (1933); I.T. 3693, 1944 CUM. BULL. 272. The
court in the Berry case supra said: " . . The plaintiff has disposed of one-half of the
oil below the 2,000 foot level and had no investment therein alter the agreement
had been executed. It had an interest in the remaining half, but the nature of that
interest was simply the right to receive it-not as rent or a payment."
203. This would appear to follow from the fact that a net profit interest is an "economic
interest" in oil or gas in place and as such an interest in real property for tax purposes. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm., 326 U.S. 599, 66 Sup. Ct. 409 (1946); I. T.
3693, 1944 CUM. BULL. 272.

204. I. T. 4003, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 10; G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 66. However,
under current rulings the grantor who carves out an oil payment has made an
assignment of future income even though the oil payment is a capital asset in the
hands of the grantee. See note 208 and related text.
205. Rawco, Inc., 37 B.T.A. 128 (1938). However, a grantor carving out a participating
interest may thereby realize income. See note 137 and related text.
206. Berry Oil Co. v. U. S., 25 F. Supp. 97 (Ct. Cl. 1939) cert. denied 307 U.S. 364.
207. See, e.g., West v. Comm., 150 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945); G.C.M. 27322 1952-2 CuM.
BULL. 62.
208. I.T. 4003, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 10 Cf. Ortiz Oil Co. v. Comm., 102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.
1939) in which the court held that the assignment of a carved out oil payment for
cash consideration resulted in a sale and presumably the resulting gain if otherwise
qualified was subject to capital gain tax treatment. The Internal Revenue Service
initially distinguished between carved out short-lived and long-lived oil payments
regarding the assignment for cash of the latter as a sale and the assignment of the
former for cash as an assignment of future income. IT. 24849, 1946-1 CUM. BULL.
66. The same distinction was initially made with respect to a gift of a carved out
oil payment-a gift of a long-lived oil payment was regarded as complete so that
the income received therefrom should be taxed to the donee, whereas a "gift" of a
short-lived oil payment was regarded as an incomplete gift and the proceeds from
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carved out oil payment is sold for cash and the vendor pledges that he will
use the proceeds in drilling and developing the lease to which the oil
payment relates, the vendor has not, under current Internal Revenue Service
constructions, made a sale and the proceeds are applied to reduce the
development cost of the property.2 ° 9 The assignment of an oil payment
in return for the drilling of a well or for equipment used in the drilling
of a well is a non-taxable pooling arrangement rather than a sale. 2 1"
Inasmuch as an assignment by a lessee who reserves an oil payment is
regarded as a sale, whereas an assignment with a reserved override is regarded as a sublease, taxpayers frequently prefer to reserve an oil payment
so that the consideration received by them will be regarded for tax purposes
as a capital gain rather than ordinary depletable income. If, however,
the oil payment is so large that there is little if any likelihood
that it will be paid off during the productive life of the property, the
Internal Revenue Service may regard the oil payment as the equivalent of
a reserved override and tax the consideration received as ordinary depletable
income.
Real property and depreciable property used in a taxpayer's trade or
,business are accorded special tax treatment under Section 117 (j) of the
Internal Revenue Code. With respect to short term gains or losses (resulting from the sale of assets held for six months or less) relating to such
assets the gain is regarded as an ordinary gain and the loss as an ordinary
loss.2 11 With respect to long term gains or losses (resulting from the sale
of assets held for for more than six months) such gains and losses are set
off against tach other and if there is a net long term gain it is treated as a
capital gain whereas if there is a net long term loss it is treated as an ordin21 2
ary loss.
Oil and gas interests can be capital assets, stock in trade, or property
used in the taxpayer's trade or business. If they constitute capital assets,
any sale thereof is subject to capital tax treatment.21 3 If they constitute
real property or depreciable property used in the taxpayer's trade or busithe oil payment taxed to the donor. I.T. 3935, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 54. Cf. R.E. Nail,
27 B.T.A. 33 (1932) holding that a gift of a carved out oil payment of short duration was not an assignment of income and that the proceeds should be taxed to the
donee. In 1950 the Internal Revenue Service abandoned the distinction between
short-lived and long-lived oil payments and took the position that the sale of all
carved out oil payments and all gifts of carved out oil payments. regardless of the
probable span of the oil payment, involved the assignment of future income. Ac-

cordingly a sale of a carved out oil payment involves an anticipation of future income
income and the cash received by the vendor is taxable as ordinary depletable income;
a gift of an oil payment according to this view results in the income accruing under
the oil payment being taxable to the donor. I.T. 4003, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 10. For
an excellent critique of these rulings see Kuntz, Assignments of Oil Payments, 31
TAXES

863 (1953).

209. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 214; G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 66; I.T. 4003,
1950-1, CUM. BULL. 10.
210. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
211. INT. REV. CoDE. Sec. 117 () (1).
212. INT. REv. Conk Sec. 117 (j) (2).
213.
rr. Rzv. CoDE Sec. 117.
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ness, they are Section 117 (j) assets.

If they are held primarily as stock

in trade, any sale thereof results in an ordinary gain or loss. 2 14

It is, there-

fore, important to determine whether the taxpayer acquires properties
primarily for the purpose of development, for investment, or for resale. In
the event they are acquired primarily for development they are Section
2 15
117 (j) assets; if acquired primarily for investment they are capital assets
21 6
and if acquired primarily for the purpose of resale they are stock in trade.
It is readily apparent that a difficult factual question is involved in each
such instance in determining for this purpose the proper classification of
the asset sold. 217

An oil and gas company regularly engaged in the busi-

ness of developing oil and gas properties ordinarily acquires property used
in its trade or business when it purchasse a lease or when it purchases
minerals for development purposes.2 18 If a company or individual acquires
a royalty of any type inasmuch as such interests ordinarily are merely held
for investment purposes and require no personal services or management
duties, they probably constitute capital assets rather than Section 117 (j)
assets. 21 9 However, in the latter situation it is also necessary to determine
whether the oil and gas interests are acquired for resale in which event
220
they are stock in trade.
Several problems arise in determining the holding period of oil and
gas properties with respect to the sale of capital assets and Section 117 (j)
assets none of which have been clearly resolved by the courts. The holding
period of a lessor who grants a lease and sells a retained royalty interest
probably runs from the date on which he acquired the mineral rights rather
than the date of the lease which is also the date on which the royalty as
such came into existence. 221 If the rationale of the decisions so holding
is that the taxpayer is in effect selling part of his retained oil rights, the
same rationale would lead to the conclusion that a taxpayer selling an
override, oil payment, net profit interest or any other interest retained by
him should regard the holding period as beginning on the date the original
mineral interest was acquired rather than the date on which the retained
interest is created. If, however, the taxpayer carves out an oil payment
from a lease or from any other oil and gas interest the present position of
214. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 117 (a) (1) (A); Greene v. Comm., 141 F.2d 645 (5th Cir, 1944).
cert. denied 323 U.S. 717.

215. Foran v. Comm., 165 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1948). U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.117(a)-1
provides in part: ". . . Property held for the production of income, but not used
in a trade or business of the taxpayer, is not excluded from the term 'capital
assets'...." But see, I.T. 3693, 1944 CUM. BULL. 272.
216. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 117 (a) (1) (A); Greene v. Comm., 141 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1944)
cert. denied 323 U.S. 717; Faring v. Comm., 13 T.C. 8 (1949).
217. Compare, e.g., Greene v. Comm., supra note 216 with Foran v. Comm., 165 F.2d 705
(5th Cir. 1948).
218. Fackler v. Comm., 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Faring v. Comm., 13 T. C. 8 (1949);
I. T. 3693, 1944 CUM. BULL. 272.
219. Fackler v. Comm., supra note 218.
220. Greene v. Comm., 141 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1944) cert. denied 323 U.S. 717; Foran
v. Comm., 165 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1948); Faring v. Comm., 13 T. C. 8 (1949).
221. Alice G. Kleberg, 2 T. C. 1024 (1943).
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the Internal Revenue Service is that he has anticipated future income and
222
as such realized ordinary depletable income.
The holding period of an oil and gas lease subject to an escrow agreement does not begin to run until the conditions of the escrow agreement
are complied 'with.2 24 The decision so holding indicated that iUthe escrqw
condition was the drilling of a well that the holding would begin with
the drilling of the well and the acquisition of the lease. 225 However, a
recent decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held with respect
to a productive lease that the holding period did not begin until production
was obtained. 226 The rationale of the decision is that the taxpayer acquires
a different property when production is obtained and that it is this new
property that he sold rather than the original property. This decision
has been criticized by several tax writers227 and may not be followea in subsequent decisions; however, it must be contended with and taxpayers accordingly would be well advised not to sell productive properties until
six months after production is obtained.
Assuming that a sale of an oil and gas property including lease equipment involves the sale of a capital asset or a section 117 (j) asset, the taxpayer in determining the gain or loss will have two cost bases to take into
consideration: (1) the acquisition cost of the lease and (2) the acquisition
cost of the lease equipment. These cost bases will be identical to those
used with respect to determining cost depletion and depreciation respectively. The initial cost bases must in each instance be adjusted by reducing it
by the amount of allowable depreciation (or depletion) or by allowed
depreciation (or depletion) if the latter is greater. If allowed depreciation
(or depletion) exceeded allowable depreciation (or depletion), the taxpayer now reduces his basis only to the extent that he defi'ed a tax benefit
228
from the excess of allowed over allowable.
If the taxpayer sells his entire interest in the property, it will probably
be regarded as two separate sales- (1) a sale of the well equipment and
(2) a sale of the oil and gas interest. 228 a If the taxpayer retains a royalty
or other continuing economic interest, he has made a sale of the well equipment and has subleased the oil and gas rights. 228 b If, on the other hand,
the taxpayer retains only an oil payment, he has made a sale of the equip222. G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 66; 1. T. 4003, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 10. See discussion
at note 208 and related text.
224. Howell v. Comm., 140 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1944).
225. Ibid.
226. Petroleum Exploration v. Comm., 193 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1951) revg 16 T. C. 277.
227. See, e.g., Bergen, Oil and Taxes-Some Problems and Proposals,26 So. CALIF. L. REV.
396, 402 n. 30 (1953).
228. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 113(b) (1) (B) (ii). For tax years prior to 1952 basis must be
reduced by greater of allowable or allowed depreciation eveni if excess of allowed
over allowable did not result in a tax benefit unless the taxpa er files an irrevocable
election in accordance with subsection (d) of INT. REV. CODE, ;ec. 113.
228a. Morris Investment Corp. Y. Comm., 5 T. C. 583 (1945) ajf'd 156 F.2d 748 (3rd Cir.
1946); Krahl v. Comm., 9 T. C. 862 (1947).
228b. Supra 108.
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ment and a sale of the oil and gas rights. 22 8 C In all three situations it is
necessary to determine what part of the purchase price represents the sales
price of the equipment and what part represents the sales price (or bonus,
as the case may be) for the oil and gas rights. In all three situations an
allocation in the contract of sale will ordinarily be determinative.2 2 d If,
however, the contract does not make an allocation the taxpayer can in the
situation in which he reserves an override recover from the purchase price
the amount of his unrecovered basis in the well equipment and regard
the balance of the purchase price as a bonus (and as such ordinary de229
If
pletable income) paid for the subleasing of the oil and gas rights.
the taxpayer reserves an oil payment so that the transaction involves a sale
rather than a lease or sublease, he probably can apply the consideration
received to the recovery of his entire basis in the depreciable equipment
and regard the balance as the sales price of the oil and gas rights. 230 If the
taxpayer sells a productive property and retains no interest in the oil and
gas rights, the allocation of the sales price should be made on the basis
of the relative fair market values of the well equipment and the oil and gas
rights. 2 3 0 a In determining the gain resulting from a transaction in which
the vendor retains an oil payment, the taxpayer should divide his basis
in the depletable property between the interest sold and the interest retained on the basis of their relative fair market values at the date of the
transaction. 23 1 The taxpayer does not, however, have to allocate part of
his basis in the depreciable equipment to the retained oil payment if the
contract of sale clearly provides that the vendor is selling all of his interest
in the equipment.2 31a, In all three situations the purchaser in the absence
of contractual allocation should determine his basis in the property acquired by allocating the sales price to depreciable equipment cost and depletable
23 2
oil and gas rights cost according to their relative fair market vatues.
NET OPERATING LOSSES

A net operating loss is the loss resulting from an excess of allowable
deductions over gross income and is computed with respect to a taxpayer's
228c. Supra 108.
228d. Fraser v. Nauts, 8 F.2d 106 (N. D. Ohio 1925).
229. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Comm., 6 T. C. 172 (1946). The basis of
the retained interest is the taxpayer's original basis in the oil and gas right. Ibid.
Cf. Choate v. Comm., 324 U.S. 1, 65 Sup. Ct. 469 (1945).
230. Thomas v. Peckham Oil Co., 115 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1940). However, it is not clear
as to whether any issue was made in this regard. The principal problem involved
the determination of the basis in the retained oil payment. See note 231 (a) and
related text.
230a. Krahl v. Comm., 9 T. C. 863 (1947). Ordinarily it will not make any difference
in this situation as to how the sales price is allocated as the loss can be offset against
the gain. It may, however, make a difference in a situation in which the taxpayer
has different holding periods re the equipment and the oil and gas interest and will
definitely make a difference in the situation in which the taxpayer is precluded
from taking a loss because of INT. REV. CODE Sec. 24(b) (1) relating to losses disallowed because of the relationship of the vendor and the vendee.
231. Columbia Oil and Gas Co. v. Comm., 118 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1941).
231a. Thomas v. Peckham Oil Co., 115 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1940).
232. Johnson Lumber Comparty v. Comm., 12 T. C. 348 (1949); Hazeltine Corp., 32
B.T.A. 4 (1935); Grain King. Manufacturing Co., 14 B.T.A. 793 (1928).
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A
entire operations and not with respect to any particular property.
taxpayer incurring a net operating loss can carry back such loss for one
year and after carrying it back can carry forward any remaining loss for
five successive years. 23 4 However, in computing the net operating loss it
must be adjusted by reducing it by the amount statutory depletion exceeds
235
Further, in
cost depletion in the year in which the loss in incurred.
carried
year
every
in
adjusted
be
it
must
carrying the loss back or forward
exceeds
depletion
statutory
by reducing it by the amount that the taxpayer's
cost depletion for that particular year.2 36 Inasmuch as statutory depletion
will ordinarily exceed cost depletion, these adjustments have the effect of
depriving the taxpayer of tax benefits from the operating loss to the extent
that statutory depletion exceeds cost depletion for the years involved since
the taxpayer would have been permitted a deduction to this extent even
in the absence of the net operating loss deduction. It is, therefore, ordinarily advisable for a taxpayer to avoid if possible incurring a net operating
loss. This can be accomplished by timing expenditures (particularly with
respect to intangibles), capitalizing delayed rentals and thereby reducing
current expenses, 23 7 or by increasing income through the sale of an oil
payment. 2 38 If, however, it is impossible for the taxpayer to realize other
income to offset the net operating loss or to limit his expenditures so as to
prevent such loss, he will of course take the net operating loss deduction
inasmuch as he will ordinarily derive some tax benefit from the deduction.
LOSSES FROM WORTHLESS OR ABANDONED OIL OR GAS PROPERTIES

The taxpayer may take as a deduction from gross income any loss other
than those resulting from the sale or exchange of capital assets sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise
if incurred in a trade or business or if incurred in any transaction entered
239
In order
into for profit though not connected with a trade or business.
to establish the loss it must be "evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by indentifiable events, bona fide and actually sustained during the taxable period for which allowed ... "240 There are three common
methods of establishing a loss- (1) by sale, (2) by abandonment, (3) by
proof of worthlessness. If, however capital assets 24 1 are involved and the
loss results from a sale of the asset the taxpayer is allowed to take the loss
233. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 122(a).
234. INT. REV. CODE SeCs. 122 (b) (1) (B), 122(b) (2) (B).
235. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 122(d). Magale v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1950);
Louisiana Delta Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. v. Comm., 7 T.C. 994 (1946).
236. IN-r. REV. CODE Sec. 122 (d).
237. Supra 92.
238. The sale of a carved out oil payment results in the receipt of ordinary depletable
income according to current constructions of the Internal Revenue Service. See
discussion at note 208 and related text.
239. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 23 (e).

INT. REV. CODE Sec. 23 (f

is the comparable provision

relating to corporate losses. Section 23 (e) also provides for certain loss deductions
with respect to property not connected with trade or business that are not pertinent

to this discussion.
240. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 23(e) -1 (b).
241. See supra 110-111 as to when an asset is a capital asset.
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only as a capital loss 242 and subject to the limitations relating to capital
losses heretofore noted. 243 Accordingly, it is invariably desirable from the
taxpayer's standpoint to establish the loss by abandonment or worthlessness in which event the taxpayer can take the loss as a deduction from gross
244
income.
The Commissioner at one time took the position that generally with
respect to oil and gas interests the loss could be established only by relinquishment of the interest or by a completed transaction in the form of a
sale.2 4 5 While as one author has pointed out 246 this ruling would have
the effect of permitting the taxpayer to choose the year in which to take
the deduction, it would also have the effect in many instances of subjecting
the loss to capital loss treatment and limitations. Accordingly, taxpayers
had considerable at stake in urging the view that a loss could be taken as
a deduction from gross income in the year in which some identifiable event
establishes the loss and that in this connection it is not necessary for the
taxpayer to relinquish (abandon) or sell his interest in the property provided the identifiable event establishes the worthlessness of the property in question. This view prevailed 247 but even after the Commissioner
conceded as much2 48 he took the position that in the absence of relinquishment or sale the taxpayer has to establish that there is no possibility of
the interest becoming valuable in the future. With respect to oil and gas
properties, according to the Commissioner, this would ordinarily require
the penetration by drilling of all of the sedimentary beds underlying the
property in question. 249 In Harmon v. Comm., 250 the United States Tax
Court rejected this view holding that a royalty (and presumably any oil
or gas interest) "becomes worthless upon the happening of some event
which results in the loss of its sale value in the ordinary channels of trade
and would cause a prudent and informed businessman to eliminate it from
the asset side of the balance sheet ... "
In view of the decision in the Harmon case it is clear that a taxpayer
can establish his loss with respect to an interest in oil and gas property by
establishing that some identifiable event occurring during the tax year
(usually the drilling of one or more dry holes on the particular property
or on property sufficiently close geologically to condemn the property in
question) has destroyed the saleability of the oil and gas interest in question
in the ordinary channels of trade. It is not necessary in this regard for
242.

INT.

REv. CODE Sec. 23 (g); Aberele v. Comm., 121 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1941); Blum

v. Comm., 133 F.2d 447 (2ud Civ. 194S) ; Fischer -v. Comm., 14 T. C. 792 (1950).

243. Supra 107.
244. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 23(e), Helvering v. Gordon, 134 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1943).
245. S. M. 5700, V-1 CuM. BULL. 241 (1926).
246. Atwood, Tax Treatment of Worthless Oil or Gas Properties in PROCEFDINGS OF THE
FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 434, 437-38 (1953).
247. Helvering v. Gordon, 134 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1943); Rhodes v. Comm., 100 F.2d 966
(6th Cir. 1939).
248.

G.C.M. 3890, VIl-I CuM. BULL. (1928).

249. G. C. Harmon v. Comm., 1 T.C. 40 (1942) acq. in 1944 CUM, BULL. 12.
250. Id. at 56.
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the taxpayer to relinquish his interest and if some identifiable event has
in fact made the interest unsaleable the loss must be taken in that year
and not in the year of relinquishment. 25 1 However, relinquishment by the
taxpayer in the year in which the identifiable event has taken place will
252
ordinarily avoid any dispute in this regard.
If the taxpayer is relying on some identifiable event which has
made the property worthless within the Harmon case definition of
worthlessness, the taxpayer must refrain from disposing of the property
in the year in which the loss is claimed in a manner which will result in
the taxpayer directly or indirectly receiving a consideration for the property. The sale of property for $250.00 in one instance 253 and the fact that
the property concededly had some value but less than $500.00254 have been

regarded as sufficient to establish that the property in question was not
worthless. The law generally makes no provision for a partial loss resulting
from a reduction in the value of the oil and gas interest and accordingly
if the property has some value the loss cannot be established on the theory
that it has become worthless. 25 5 In this regard the Tax Court has insisted

that property will for this purpose be regarded as a single unit so that a
taxpayer cannot (even if he has separate bases in the minerals and surface)
deduct as a loss his basis in the minerals when the mineral rights are
established to be worthless if the property has any value for any other
purpose. 256 This decision, of course, has no application to the taxpayer
2 57
who has only an interest in the minerals.
The fact that the property in question must be worthless in order for
the taxpayer to deduct a loss for worthlessness, does not mean that the
taxpayer cannot sell the property or otherwise receive income from the
property in some subsequent year without destroying the previous deduction. The subsequent sale or recovery of income from the property does
not invalidate the deduction if when taken it was based on the exercise
of a reasonable judgment from the facts then known. 258 However, the
sale of the property for a considerable sum within a relatively short-time
of the tax year in which the deduction was taken undoubtedly would be
some evidence of the fact that the property was not worthless in the year
in which the deduction was taken. 2 5 8 a If the taxpayer recovers part of the
251. G. C. Harmon v. Comm., supra note 249.
252. Ibid. Even with respect to losses established by abandonment it is necessary to
establish worthlessness of the rights relinquished; otherwise the taxpayer has made a
gift. Mack v. Comm., 129 F.2d 598 (2nd Cir. 1942).
253. Aberele v. Comm., 121 F.2d '726 (3rd Cir. 1941).
254. U. S. v. Sentinel Oil Co., 109 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1940) cert. denied 310 U.S. 645.
255. Ibid.
256. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Comm., 7 T. C. 507 (1946) afI'd 161 F.2d
842 (5th Cir. 1947); Coalinga-Mohawk Oil Co. v. Comm., 64 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.
1933). But cf. Pool v. U.S. 119 F. Supp. 202 (Ct. CI. 1954).
257. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Comm., 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947).
258. United States v. S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U. S. 398, 47 Sup. Ct. 598 (1927):
G. C. Harmon v. Comm., I T. C. 40 (1942).
258a. In Fischer v. Comm., 14 T. C. 792 (1950), for example, the taxpayer drilled a dry
hole in 1943 and had been advised by a geologist that the drilling condemned the
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loss in subsequent years, it becomes a part of his gross income in the year
of receipt. 25 9 Although the Board of Tax Appeals has held that the taxpare is not precluded from subsequentily taking a deduction for depletion
with respect to the proceeds from an oil and gas interest previously written
off as a loss, 260 Form 927, which must be filed in connection with a claim
for a loss deduction resulting from worthlessness of mineral rights, contains
an undertaking on the part of the taxpayer to refrain from taking statutory
depletion with respect to such subsequent production to the extent of the
loss deducted for worthlessness.
A number of pre-Harmon case decisions of the Tax Court appear to
be outmoded by the decision in the Harmon case although they were not
specifically overruled. Some tax commentators (and the Commissioner
may do likewise) have continued to regard such decisions as controlling
with respect to the narrow problem involved in each such case although
to some extent at least they appear to be open to question in the light of
the rationale of the Harmon case. Under these pre-Harmon case decisions
a lessee ordinarily could take a loss deduction because of worthlessness of
the lease only if he permitted the lease to be forfeited or otherwise terminated; in effect requiring the lessee to abandon the lease before taking
the loss deduction. 261 Accordingly, under these decisions if the lessee
continued to pay the delay rentals 2 62 or if he continued to produce the
lease at a non-commercial rate in order to retain the lease 263 he was not
permitted to take a deduction for worthlessness. Another pre-Harmon case
decision held that the owner of a royalty could not, in effect, ever take a
deduction for worthlessness as he was unable to forfeit (abandon) his interest. 2 6 3a The rationale of these cases appears to be that the failure to relinquish (particularly, if the taxpayer has to expend money in order to
prevent forfeiture) indicates that the taxpayer believes the pioperty to
have some value 26 4 and further in situations in which the taxpayer does
not relinquish the property there is always the possibility that it will become
property in question. In 1944 the taxpayer invested an additional $5,000 and a gas
company interested in obtaining the gas production invested an additional $15,000
in drilling another well on the lease which also proved to be dry. The Tax Court
acknowledged that with only the 1943 experience before it that they would probably
have concluded that the property became worthless in 1943, but that the action of
the taxpayer and the gas company in 1944 led the court to conclude that the lease
was not in fact worthless in 1943. See also discussion at note 266a.
259. Burmet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150 (1931); Rhodes v.
Comm., 100 F.2d 966 (6th Cir. 1939); G. C. Harmon v. Comm., 1 T.C. 40 (1942).
Under current regulations, however, the taxpayer has to regard the recovery of losses
taken in prior tax year as income only to the extent that the previous deductions

resulted In a tax benefit. U.S. Treas. Reg. 11%, Sec. 19.22 (b) -1241) .
260. Louisiana Iron and Supply Co., 44 B.T.A. 1244 (1941).
261. A. T. Jergins Trust, 22 11.T.A. 551 (1931); Macon Oil and Gas Co., 23 B.T.A. 54
(1931) ; Roy Nichols, 17 1.T.A. 580 (1929).

262. A. T. Jergins Trust, 22 B.T.A. 551 (1931).
263. Macon Oil and Gas Co., 23 B.T.A. 54 (1931).
263a. Roy Nichols, 17 B.T.A. 580 (1929).

264. Macon Oil and Gas Co., 23 B.T.A. 54 (1931); A. T. Jergins Trust, 22 B.T.A. 551
(1931); Roy Nichols, 17 B.T.A. 580

(1929).
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valuable in the future. In this latter regard the Tax Court in the royalty
2 65
case referred to said:
Interests in royalty rights are interests running with the land,
and unless specifically limited as to time or otherwise, are not
forfeitable. They may become unsaleable, dormant for a time as
it were, but still remain an asset, an asset of questionable value it
may be, but nevertheless an asset, that may become valuable any
day, and hence may not be deemed such an ascertained loss as to
be deductible in determining net profits for taxation purposes.
This rationale is, of course, inconsistent with the decision of the Harmon
case in which the Tax Court specifically held that the criterion of worthlessness is unsaleability. The Court in the Harmon case also rejected the
argument that the interest might become valuable at some future date,
stating, "We do not think, however, that the mere 'possibility' of future
production is in itself sufficient to give value to oil royalties which have
been condemned as worthless by those engaged in the trade and familiar
with the development of those particula are&." 266 The retention of the
royalty by the royalty owner or the lease by the lessee (even in situations
in which the lessee will have to expend money in order to retain the lease)
would not in view of this rationale preclude the taking of a deduction for
worthlessness if the royalty and/or the lease is in fact unsaleable in the
ordinary channels of trade. The fact that the interest holder is willing to
expend money in order to retain his property and prevent a forfeiture does
not necessarily mean that the property is saleable or has any value from
a practical standpoint. In many instances the interest holder has already
made a substantial investment and is, therefore, willing to invest nominal
additional amounts although the property has no market value. 2 6 a
The deduction as a loss of an in-vestment in oil and gas rights can, of
course, be taken with respect to producing properties to the extent that the
taxpayer still has a basis in the property in question at the time the loss
is established either because of worthlessness or by abandonment. Even
in the absence of production inasmuch as a taxpayer cannot take a partial
265. Roy Nichols, 17 B.T.A. 580, 583 (1929).
266. G. C. Harmon v. Comm., 1 T. C. 40, 58 (1942).
266a. In Fischer v. Comm., 14 T. C. 792 (1950) which post-dates the Harmon case the
Tax Court did regard the fact that the taxpayer spent additional money on the
property as significant in establishing that the property was not worthless. However,
the taxpayer in that case spent $5,000 (and another party spent $15,000) for the
purpose of drilling an additional well after the year in which he claimed the lease
became worthless. The court carefully distinguished the situation in which nominal
suma are spent in the hope at salvagitng a substzntial investment stating in this
regard-". . . but when we look at 1944 we find petitioner making a further investment of $5,000 in the drilling of the second well. This action did not corroborate,
rather it negatives, the petitioner's claim of worthlessness. The record does not
convince us that the $5,000 was an investment in extremis-a desperate attempt to
salvage something from the ruins of a former larger investment. Rather, it speaks
more loudly than petitioner's words of protest of a persisting value in the leases
as gas and oil property. On the whole record, we conclude that the leases did
not become worthless until they were abandoned after the second well proved to be
a dry hole. Since this occurred in 1944, it follows that petitioner was not justified
in claiming a deduction for worthlessness of his investment in 1943."
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loss 267 it is clear that the entire property must become worthless or be
abandoned before the loss deduction can be taken. 268 This is particularly
true with respect to producing wells since the taxpayer's basis in the oil and
gas interest (as distinguished from the physical equipment) must be recovered through the depletion allowance 26 9 and it is only to the extent
that the basis is not recovered through depletion that the taxpayer has
suffered a loss. 270 Inasmuch as depletion is computed with respect to each
separate property no determination can be made of whether the depletion
allowance is going to result in the recovery of the entire basis until the
entire property is abandoned or becomes worthless. 27 1 Accordingly, the
Tax Court has consistently held that the abandonment of a well in the
absence of an abandonment of the entire prpoerty on which it is located
does not permit the taxpayer to deduct as a loss the difference between the
basis attributable to the well abandoned and the amount of depletion
27 2
previously taken and attributable to that well.
Are there any situations in which a taxpayer can deduct as an ordinary
loss his investment in oil and/or gas interests or equipment without relinquishing the interest or equipment and without establishing its worthlessness? U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 23 (e) -3 (a) suggests some such possibilities in that it provides that a taxpayer can deduct as an ordinary (as
distinguished from capital) loss assets discarded permanently from use in
the taxpayer's business when through some change in business conditions
the usefulness of the asset in the business is suddenly terminated. To
establish such loss it is necessary under the provisions of the regulation for
the property to be prematurely discarded as the result of some unforseen
cause. An ordinary loss for assets so discarded can be taken regardless of
the fact that the property is sold as salvage for a fairly substantial sum, 27 3
and hence it is clear that it is not necessary under this provision to establish
the worthlessness of the property. In Coalinga-Mohwak Oil Co. v.
Comm. 274 a taxpayer who had purchased the fee title to both the surface
and minerals, but who purchased the property primarily because of
its oil potentialities, attempted to invoke this provision after the mineral
rights became worthless to justify a deduction as an ordinary loss of the
difference between the purchase price of the property and its "salvage"
value for non-mineral purposes. The court refused to permit such deduction because the taxpayer knew that the property might prove nonproductive and therefore the discarding of the asset did not result from
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

U.S. v. Sentinel Oil Co., 109 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1940) cert. denied 310 U. S. 645.
Berkshire Oil Co. v. Comm., 9 T. C. 903 (1947).
See supra 95.
Witherspoon Oil Co., 34 B.T.A. 1130 (1936).
Ibid.
Witherspoon Oil Co., 34 B.T.A. 1130 (1936); Lyons v .Comm., 10 T.C. 634 (1948).
S. S. White Dental Manufacturing Co. v. U. S., 55 F. Supp. 117 (Ct. Cl. 1944);
Industrial Cotton Mills, 43 B.T.A. 107 (1940).
The salvage value can in fact be
substantial; in the White Dental case the salvage value of the equipment at the
time it was discarded from use in the business was estimated to be approximately
$75,000 and was actually disposed of for $83,000.
274. 64 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1933).
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an "unforseen cause". However, the court distinguished the case from a
situation in which the taxpayer merely owned the minerals. In view of a
subsequent decision limiting the Coalinga case to the proposition that a
taxpayer who owns both the surface and the minerals must regard the
property as a single unit for the purpose of establishing worthlessness, 27 5
the obvious inapplicability of this doctrine to the situation where the taxpayer owns only a right in the worthless minerals may have been the distinction the court had in mind. From the standpoint of forseeability of
non-production there would appear to be no material difference between
the situation in which the taxpayer purchases the entire fee and the situation in which he merely purchases mineral rights.
As previously discussed in detail a taxpayer can take as a deduction
from gross income a reasonable allowance for depreciation of tangible
physical equipment.2 76 A taxpayer who depreciates the individual items
(pumps, casing, tubing, etc.) and who uses the maximum life expectancy
of the item in question, can upon its retirement, normal or otherwise,
deduct as a loss any unrecovered basis in the item. 276 0

If the taxpayer

groups various items for depreciation purposes and if the depreciation rate
is based on the life expectancy of the longest lived item in the group, the
taxpayer can deduct as a loss the unrec'overed basis of any item retired
whether the retirement is normal or otherwise. 276b If, however, the taxpayer groups various items into a single account for depreciation purposes
and uses an average life expectancy he cannot in the case of normal retirement of the individual items deduct as an ordinary loss his unrecovered
basis until the entire group of items has been retired.216c The extent to
which the taxpayer can deduct such items as a loss prior to the retirement
of the entire group will usually depend upon the extent to which U.S. Treas.
Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3 (a) is applicable.
In the event the taxpayer for depreciation purposes groups all of the
physical items relating to a single well into one account and uses the
straightline method of depreciation, he can, if he forsees that the life of the
275, Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Comm., 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947).
276. Supra 105-107.

276a. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3(d). This entire discussion assumes that the
taxpayer has adjusted his basis by the higher of allowed or allowable depreciation.
If the taxpayer has not taken the full amount of the allowable depreciation in
previous years he cannot deduct as a loss upon retirement any unrecovered basis
attributable to his failure to take the full depreciation allowance in previous years.
Kittredge v. Comm., 88 F.2d 632 (2nd Cir. 1937). Mim. 4170 (rev.), XV-2 CUM.
BULL. 148 states in this regard: "A taxpayer is not permitted under the law to take
advantage in later years of his prior failure to take any depreciation allowance or his
action in taking an allowance plainly inadequate under the known facts in prior
years." This is an area iii which the Commissioner may attempt to rely on hindsight
rather than an objective appraisal of the facts as they existed at the time the
depreciation rate was set. See, e.g., Illinois Pipe Line Co., 37 BT.A. 1070 (1938). The
ensuing discussion assumes that it is not necessary to establish worthlessness under
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 23 (e)-3 (a) for it is clear that this regulation assumes the
property will have salvage value at the time it is discarded. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
Sec. 39.23 (e) -3.
276.b. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3 (d).
276c. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3 (b) .
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resource is going to be less than the life of the equipment, use the life of
the resource as the life expectancy of the well equipment in determining
the depreciation rate. 27 7 Accordingly, the taxpayer will recover his entire
cost basis in the equipment through the depreciation allowance by accurately estimating the life expectancy of the resource as applied to the individual
well. If the taxpayer has estimated the life of the resource incorrectly and
it is exhausted before he has recovered his entire basis in the well equipment,
this would appear to be normal retirement of all of the items in the group
and he could take as a loss at that time any unrecovered basis in the well
2 78
equipment.
If the taxpayer groups all wells on a particular property into a single
composite account for depreciation purposes using the straight-line method
based on the average life expectancy of the well equipment, the taxpayer
could not deduct any unrecovered basis relating to the abandonment of
27 9
If, however, the
equipment on a single well upon normal retirement.
is no longer
well
particular
the
because
but
well is not retired normally
his unreloss
as
a
take
can
capable of producing, the taxpayer probably
The
well.
particular
the
to
covered basis in the well equipment relating
disbeen
principal problem in this respect is whether the equipment has
280
cause.
unforseen
an
of
because
business
carded from use in the taxpayer's
The examples cited in the regulation make apparent that foreseeability is
related to probability and if the event that has occurred is the type that is
not probable, and therefore difficult if not impossible to account for in
setting the depredation rate, the event is not foreseeable. 28 ' In view of this
exhaustion of
fact the discarding of well equipment because of premature
282
the resource would appear to justify a loss deduction.
If, however, the taxpayer uses a property-wide composite account and
determines the life expectancy of the equipment by the life expectancy of
the resource, he probably cannot take a loss deduction for the unrecovered
basis in a well abandoned because of non-production until the entire prop277. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -18 However, the taxpayer must in this regard
establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the reasonable life of the
resource is shorter than the normal useful life of the physical equipment.
278. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3 (b).
279. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 59.23 (e) -3 (b); Witherspoon Oil Co., 34 B.T.A. 1130 (1936).
279a.Ibid.U.S. Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2nd Cir. 1943) ; AetnaStandard Engineering Co. v. Comm., 15 T. C. 284 (1950).
280. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3.
281. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3(a) provides in part, ".. • in order to establish
a loss requires proof of some unforseen cause by reason of which the property has
been prematurely discarrded, as, for example, where an increase in the cost or
change in the manufacture of any product ma fes it necessary to abaridon nuth man" This type of cause obviously is not unforseeable but since it is
ufacture ..
unlikely to happen it is difficult to take care of it through the usual deductions
for depreciation or obolescence.
282. Ibid. However, the taxpayer probably has to establish that the equipment cannot
be used for similar purposes on other properties either by him or by someone else.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3(a) specifically requires that "its use as such is
permanently abandoned." See Mohawk Petroleum Co. v. Comm., 148 F.2d 957 (9th
Cir. 1945) (concurring opinion) and compare Industrial Cotton Mills, 43 B.T.A. 107
(1940) with Wilson Line, Inc. v. Comm., 8 T. C. 394 (1947).
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erty has been abandoned. 2 83 In this situation it would appear that since
the depreciation rate is based on the average life of the resource, which
takes into account the varying lives of the different wells on the same
property, that the retirement of an individual well is normal retirement
of one item in the composite account. If, however, the taxpayer can establish that the life expectancy of the resource used in determining the depreciation rate will equal or exceed the life of any asset in the composite
account ( that is, no well will produce longer than the life expectancy used),
the taxpayer has used the life of the longest lived asset and accordingly can
take the unrecovered basis of individual wells as a loss as they are individ28 4
ually retired.
If the taxpayer uses a composite property-wide account and the unit of
production method of computing depreciation, he cannot deduct as a loss
his unrecovered basis in the equipment upon abandonment of individual
wells. Inasmuch as in this situation the depreciation rate assumes a recovery of the cost basis in the equipment over the productive life of the
entire property and the estimated reserves are computed for the entire
property, "no retirement loss is allowable so long as the lease continues to
produce and other equipment on the same lease is in use." 2 s 4a The problem
in this respect is very similar to the situation with respect to recovery upon
abandonment of a single well of those costs normally recoverable through
4
the depletion allowance.2s b
If no loss can be taken under any of the foregoing theories with respect
to oil and gas interests or equipment, the taxpayer may be able to obtain
substantially similar deductions by selling the equipment if it has been held
for six months and is a Section 117 (j) asset, as it frequently will be in the
case of equipment and in the case of oil and gas interests other than royalty
interests. 28 4c The main advantage of taking a loss as an ordinary loss
rather than a loss on the sale of Section 117 (j) assets is that with respect
to the latter type loss, although it is regarded as an ordinary loss and hence
is deductible from ordinary income, before it can be deducted it must (if it
is a long term loss) be offset against long term gains resulting from the sale
of other Section 117 (j) assets.2 84 d In some instances this will result in reducing the loss or eliminating it entirely; while it is true that losses so
applied reduce the amount of taxable gain the loss is being used to offset
a gain taxable at capital gain rates.
The basis for determining the amount of the deduction for losses sustained when property is abandoned or becomes worthless is the adjusted
283 . U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3 (b).
284. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (e) -3 (d) ; Illinois Pipe Line Co., 37 B.T.A. 1070
(1938); U. S. Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2nd Cir. 1943).
284a. Mohawk Petroleum Co. v. Comm., 47 B.T.A. 952, 958 (1942) afrd 148 F.2d 957 (9th
Cir. 1945).
284b. See supra 118-119.
284c. See supra 110-111 as to when property is a Section 117(j) asset.
284d. See supra 110.
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basis (Section 113 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code) used in determining
the loss from the sale or other disposition of the property.2 8 5 With respect
to losses established on the theory of worthlessness or abandonment, no
adjustment need be made for salvage value for presumably there is none.
However, with respect to a loss based on the premature discarding of an
asset because no longer useful in the taxpayer's business the loss allowed
is the difference between the adjusted basis and the estimated salvage value
28 6
of the asset in question.
Section 130 of the Internal Revenue Code limits the losses that can be
sustained by providing that if in each of five consecutive years the deductions (other than taxes and interest) allowable to an individual and attributable to a particular trade or business exceed the gross income from the
particular trade or business by more than $50,000, the tax for each of the
five years shall be recomputed. In making the required recomputation
the taxpayer can deduct otherwise allowable deductions from gross income
only to the extent that they do not exceed the gross income from the particular trade or business by $50,000 for that particular year. Accordingly,
the net loss for each of the years involved relating to a particular business
cannot exceed $50,000 upon recomputation. Further, in making the recomputation the net operating loss 28 7 for each such year must be eliminated
entirely to the extent that it is attributable to such trade or business. The
Internal Revenue Service has recently ruled that in computing the loss for
Section 130 purposes, that in the case of partnerships the loss attributed
to the taxpayer-partner is to be limited to the taxpayer's distributive share
288
of the partnership loss.
SEPARATE PROPRIETIES

As previously noted several tax determinations depend upon what
constitutes a separate property. In this respect the 50% net income limitation on statutory depletion must be determined with respect to each separate
property. 28 9 Before the taxpayer can deduct as a loss his basis in a worthless oil and gas interest the entire interest must be condemned or abandoned. 290 The recipient of a "bonus" must restore to income any depletion
allowance taken with respect to such "bonus" in the year in which the
lessee abandons the property in question. 29 ' Questions also arise as to what
constitutes a "property" in computing a gain or loss on the sale of an oil
and gas interest. 29 2 The Tax Court although conceding that the "argument is not with force" rejected the contention of the Commissioner that
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

G. C. Harmon v. Comm., I T. C. 40 (1942); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Ses. 39.23 (e) -2.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (3) -3(a).
See supra 113-114 as to circumstances under which the net operating loss can be taken.
Rev. Rul. 155,'1.R.B., August 17, 1953, p. 6.
Supra 90-92.
Berkshire Oil Co., 9 T. C. 903 (1947).
Driscoll v. Comm., 147 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1945).
Supra 107-113.
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the "property" unit is the same for all tax purposes. 293 However, the determination of what constitutes a separate property for depletion purposes,
for restoration of depletion to income, and for purposes of the loss deduction for worthlessness are necessarily interrelated and presumably a decision
in one context is some authority in resolving the similar problem in another
294
context.
If a landowner owning an extensive tract of land enters into several
leases with different individuals, each lease constitutes a separate property
at least for restoration of depletion purposes.2 95 A lease covering more
than one tract is a single property if the tracts are contiguous along one
side.29 6 The Tax Court has held that noncontiguous tracts (including
tracts contiguous only at one corner) covered by the same lease, each constitute separate properties for the purpose of determining whether the
lessee can deduct a loss for worthlessness. 29 7 However, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that non-contiguous tracts covered by the same
lease constitute one property for the purpose of determining whether the
298
lessor has to restore depletion on bonus to income.
Internal Revenue Service rulings take the position that if a taxpayer
acquires two adjacent tracts from two separate owners in the same year
they are two separate properties at least for depletion purposes. 299 If, however, the taxpayer then sells the two adjoining tracts by the means of a
single instrument his vendee acquires one property.300 However, according to the rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, three separate properties
result where a taxpayer acquires three non-contiguous tracts from one per293. Black Mt. Corp., 5 T. C. 1117, 1120 (1945). U.S. Treas. 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-1 defines
"property" with respect to the use of that term in connection with percentage
depletion as follows: "The property, as used in Section 114(b) (2) (3) and (4) and
Sections 39.25 (m) -1 to 59.25 (m) -19, inclusive, means the interest cwned b "the
taxpayer in any mineral property. The taxpayer's interest in each separate mineral
property is a separate 'property'; but, where two or more mineral properties are
included in a single tract or parcel of land, the taxpayer's interest in such mineral
properties may be considered to be a single 'property' provided such treatment is
consistently followed."
294. For an outspoken view to the contrary see Borden, A Survey of "The Property" As
Referred to in Section 114(bX3) of the Internal Revenue Code, OIL AND GAs TAx
Mr. Borden's view is that the "mineral deposit" as such is
QUARTERLY 15 (1953).
the property for purposes of determining statutary depletion and that the boundaries
of the tract or parcel determine the property for other tax purposes (gain and loss
loss on sale, abandonment, loss, etc.). See in this connection discussion at note 304.
It is clear from the decisions that the -Tax Court regards "the property" for depletion
purposes as closely related to the property for purposes of abandonment. Witherspoon Oil Co., 34 B.T.A. 1130 (1936); Berkshire Oil Co., 9 T. C. 903 (1947).
295. Sneed v. Comm., 119 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1941).
296. Berkshire Oil Co., 9 T. C. 903 (1947) . Each separate well ordinarily is not a separate
property. Lyon v. Comm., 10 T. C. 634 (1948).
297. Berkshire Oil Co., 9 T. C. 903 (1947).
298. Houston Farm Development Co. v. Comm., 194 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 19.52). See also
Driscoll v. Comm., 147 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1945). G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 CuM. BULL.
245 is contra and takes the position that separate tracts are separate properties and
that separate tracts exist when they are divided geographically.
299. G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1, CuM BULL. 245 as modified in G.C.M. 24094, 1944 CuM. BULL.
250.
300. Ibid.
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son in a single deed.8 0 ' The Tax Court has rejected the government's
contention that each separate acquisition necessarily constitutes a separate
property and accordingly it is not clear as to the extent that the taxpayer
can combine as a single property tracts acquired as the result of separate
acquisitions.8 0 2 This situation frequently presents itself when an oil operator puts together a lease block consisting of a number of individual leases
acquired from several lessors. The Tax Court in permitting the taxpayer
to combine as one property separate acquisitions, regarded the "economic
and practical unit" from the standpoint of operations as the "property" for
depletion purposes.3 03 Conceivably as applied to oil and gas development
this view might permit a taxpayer to combine as a single property his
interest in a single oil or gas pool, as from the operator's standpoint the
30 4
pool is in many respects the economic or practical unit for operations.
However, on the other hand, inasmuch as each lease has its own drilling
requirements, royalty provisions, etc., it could be argued that the individual
lease constitutes the "economic" or "practical" unit for operation.30 5
Although the Commissioner has refused to acquiesce therein, the Tax
Court has held that where the taxpayer received part of the working interest
and an oil payment in one transaction, the taxpayer has two separate properties for the purpose of computing depletion.3 0 6 The Commissioner had
301.

302.

303.
304.

305.

306.

Ibid. This appears to be contra to the holding of Houston Farm Development Co.
V. Comm., 194 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1952).
In this case the Tax Court held that the
Black Mt. Corp., 5 T.C. 1117 (1945).
taxpayer could regard two contiguous coal mines separately acquired but involving
the same seam of coal as one property disregarding in this regard G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1
Cum. BULL. 245. The court stated (at pp. 1121-22): "We are unable to see the
necessity for the Commissioner's contention that every separate acquisition of coal
lands must be treated as a separate property for the purpose of computing percentage
depletion. Separate acquisitions can, under proper circumstances, be combined to
form one property and, likewise, under proper circumstances, one acquisition may
become a part of two different properties for this purpose."
Black Mt. Corp., 5 T.C. 1117, 1120 (1945).
Mr. Borden, supra note 294, argues that despite any Internal Revenue Service rulings
or judicial decisions to the contrary that there can be no other conclusion with
respect to "the property" for statutory depletion purposes. He argues that the
appropriate regulations relating to a definition of "the property" for this purpose
now have the force of law because of repeated statutory re-enactments since the adoption of the regulations. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, 39.23(m)-1, the argument continues,
defines "the property" to mean "the interest owned by the taxpayer in any mineral
property." U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1 (b) defines a "mineral property"
as the "mineral deposit, the devlopment and plant necessary for its extraction, and
so much of the surface of the land only as is necessary for purposes of mineral extraction ..
" Accoringly, he concludes (at p. 19) that the property for statutory
depletion purposes is "the three dimensions of the mineral deposit (namely, each
separate productive structure or pool), the development and plant necessary for its
extraction, and the two dimensions of such much of the surface only as is necessary
" Although Mr. Borden does not cite the
for the purpose of mineral extraction ..
Black Mt. Corp. case, supra note 303, the reasoning of this case parallels his in many
respects, the court relying in large part (at p. 1120) on the definition of a "mineral
property" as found in U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23 (m) -1 (b).
The Black Mt. case, supra note 303, involved contiguous tracts. However, if the
criterion for determining boundaries of separate properties for percentage depletion
purpose is the oil and gas structure or pool the fact that the tracts are not contiguous
should not make any difference in this respect.
Herndon Drilling Co. v. Comm., 6 T.C. 628 (1946) non-acq 1946-2 CUM. BULL. 6.
Cf. Mascot Oil Co. v. Comm., 29 B.T.A. 652 (1933) (Petitiori for review dismissed)
75 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1935).
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previously established a precedent for this holding by successfully contending that a taxpayer who had a working interest with respect to one
portion of a mine and a royalty interest with respect to another portion
thereof, had two separate properties. 30 7 Two separate interests in the same
property if separately acquired (e.g., taxpayer acquires one-eighth working
interest and subsequently acquries one-fourth working interest in the same
1 Although not
tract) constitute two separate properties for tax purposes. 3°8
different mintwo
to
regard
able
be
may
taxpayer
a
doubt,
of
clear
entirely
the same
under
horizon
same
the
from
produced
gas)
erals (e.g., oil and
309
at his
may
The
taxpayer
property.
a
separate
tract as each constituting
mineral
more
two
or
regard
consistently,
election, provided he does so
deposits (ordinarily production from two horizons) from the same tract
as one property, if they were acquired as part of one transaction and would
otherwise have been considered as a separate property if there had been
only one mineral deposit.3 10
NON-TAXABLY EXCHANGES

Exchanges of property held for productive use in trade or business or
for investment for property of a like kind are non-taxable. 31' The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that the exchange of a fee
interest in the minerals for an oil payment is a tax-free exchange of real
property interests of a like kind. 312 In reaching this conclusion the court
rejected the contention that the interests were not of a like kind in that
the mineral interest was for an indefinite period whereas the oil payment
was for a definite period. 313 The court emphasized the fact that both were
interests in the minerals and both were interests in real property. 314 Accordingly, it would appear that any type of oil and gas right can be exchanged for another oil avid gas interest without incurritng a tax. 315
If the promoters of a corporation transfer oil and gas properties to a
corporation which they control in exchange for stock the exchange is not
taxable. 316 However, "control" for this purpose requires that the trans307. Helvering v. Jewell Mining Co., 126 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942). This case is, however, distinguishable from the Herndon case, supra note 306 in that the two interests
were acquired at different times and related to different parts of the tract in question.
308. G.C.M. 24094, 1944 CUM. BuLL. 250; ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 80.
309. Gray v. Comm., 183 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1950) holding that for purposes of determining whether a transaction involves a sale or sublease that the oil rights and the
gas rights relating to the same tract may be considered two separate properties. •
310. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-1(i); G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 245;
G.C.M. 24094, 1944 CuM. BuLL. 250.
is net available to
hqw~rxto1,loe-qer,
S11. lWt. VPs.. Gos Sec. 1l'Z (h) (lx . This

exchanges involving stock in trade or securities. Ibid.
312. Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1943).
313. Ibid.
514. Ibid.

315. It has, for example, been held that an exchange of productive acreage for non-productive is an exchange of property of like kind. (E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 k1940)
as in an exchange of oil and gas rights for a fee interest in improved urban realty
(Comm. v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941).) See also I. T. 4093, 1952-2 CUM.
316.

BuLL. 130.
INT. REv. CoDE Sec. 112(b) (5).
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ferors own 80% of the voting stock and 80% of all other classes of stock of

the corporation after the completion of the transaction. 317 If more than
one individual is involved in the transfer, they must own after the transfer
the same relative proportionate interest in the corporation as they owned
318
in the property prior to its transfer to the corporation.
The assignment of an oil and gas interest in exchange for equipment to
be used in drilling a well on the same property or in return for an agreement on the part of the assignee to drill a well is not taxable. The transaction is view as a pooling or sharing arrangement rather than a taxable
exchange of property of an unlike kind.3 19 In connection with such transactions the assignor should allocate part of his basis in the oil and gas
rights to the depreciable equipment in which he acquires an interest-3 20
He cannot, however, as previously noted, deduct any part of the intangible
drilling and development costs as they are not incurred by him.3 2 1 If the
assignor also receives cash in connection with the transaction he must treat
the cash as income in determining the gain or loss on the sale of the
3 22
interest.
ASSOCIATIONS TAXED AS CORPORATIONS

It is generally desirable in order to avoid double taxation on income
and in order to permit the taxpayer to obtain the full benefit of the statutory depletion allowance3 24 to have the proceeds from production taxed
to the individual interest holders rather than to an association taxable as
a corporation.3 2 5 Co-lessees under current rulings are not taxed as a cor317.
318.

INT. REV. CODE Sec. 112(h).
INT. REV. CODE Sec. 112(b) (5).

319. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec.
39.23(m)-16(a) (1); S. M. 3322, IV-1 CUM. BUl.L. 112
(1925); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 CUM. BULL. 214. See also Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v.
Comm., 328 U.S. 25, 66 Sup. Ct. 961 (1946); Ra'wco Inc., 37 B.T.A. 129 (19SB);
E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940).
320. INT. REV. CODE Secs. 113(a) (6), 113(b) (2), 114(a), 114(b) (1).
E. C. Laster, 43
B.T.A. 159 (1940). The allocation should be made on the basis of the relative fair
market values of the depreciable and depletable properties. Ibid.
321. Supra 109.
322. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 214. Whether regarded as ordinary income or a
capital gain depends upon the usual factors discussed supra 107-113. The taxpayer determines his basis in the part sold by allocating the original basis between
the part sold and the part retained on the basis of their relative fair market values.
Columbia Oil and Gas Co. v. Comm., 118 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1941).
323. As is well known, corporate earnings are taxed to the corporation and when distributed to the stockholders are also taxable income to the stockholder. INT. REV.
CODE Secs. 13 and 22a.
324. In determining a corporation's income for the purpose of determining the taxability
of a corporate distribution to stockholders the excess of statutory depletion over
cost depletion has to be added back to the net income of the corporation. U.S. Treas.
Reg. 118, Sec. 39.115 (a) -2(c) (1). Accordingly, to the extent that the corporate
distribution represents the increment of net income resulting from the statutory
depletion allowance the stockholder is taxed on income that would have been tax
free if he (rather than the corporation) could have taken the statutory depletion
allowance. A corporate stockholder cannot take the statutory depletion allowance
with respect to corporate distributions based on earnings from oil and gas interests
and this is true with respect to a closed corporation. Tressler v. Comm., 206 F.2d
538 (4th Cir. 1953).
325. The position of the Internal Revenue Service in regard to the taxation of oil and
gas ventures as corporations is set forth in I. T. 3930, 1948-2 CuM. BULL. 126 and I. T.
3948, 1949-1 CUM. BULL. 161.
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poration if the operating agreement reserves the right to the co-owners to
take their share of the production in kind or if the co-owners reserve the
right to direct the sale of the minerals produced. 326 The co-owners can
reserve the right to direct the sale by individually entering into a purchase
agreement or granting an option to purchase of an indefinite duration and
in this respect it is immaterial that other co-owners enter into similar
contracts provided they each enter into the contract as an individual and
not through a common agent.3 27 The co-owner may also in this respect
grant irrevocable agency powers to dispose of his share of production provided his agent is not another co-owner or an agent with like powers of
agency from another co-owner.3 28 Nor, under present rulings, is the coowner deemed to have lost the right to direct the sale of his share of production if he grants revocable at will authority to an agent representing
two or more co-owners to enter into a purchase agreement or grant an
option to purchase for such reasonable periods of time as are consistent
with the minimum needs of the industry under the circumstances, but not
to exceed one year. 2
Co-lessees developing a property under an operating agreement constitute an association taxable as a corporation, according to current Internal
Revenue Service rulings, if they irrevocably authorize another co-owner or
agent with like powers of agency from another co-owner to act as their
agent in selling their share of production or in granting options to purchase
their share of production.33 0 Co-owners who grant revocable at will authority to another co-owner or his agent, constitute an association taxable as a
corporation if the agent has authority to conclude contracts of sale or to
grant options for a period longer than reasonably required by the minimum
needs of the industry under the circumstances. 3 3 1 In this regard the contract entered into or the option granted cannot be for a period of time
exceeding one year.3 8 2
The foregoing summarizes the position of the Internal Revenue Service
as to the manner in which co-lessees developing an oil and gas property are
to be taxed. However, the position of the Service in this respect is not
entirely consistent with some of the litigated cases. In Stantex Petroleum
Co. v. Comm.

3 33

the operator was granted the right to contract for the

sale of all the oil and gas produced including the share of various holders
of fractional undivided interests in the lease. The operating agreement
which was part of the assignment to interest holders did not limit the
period for which such contracts could be granted and did not reserve in
the interest holder the right to revoke the operator's authority to execute
326. I.T. 3930, 1948-2 CUM. BULL. 126; I.T. 3948, 1949-1 CUM. BULL. 161.

327.
528.
329.
330.
531.
32.
333.

I. T. 3930, 1948-2 CUM. BULL. 126.
I. T. 3948, 1949-1 CUM. BULL. 161.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
38 B.T.A. 269 (1958) non-acq. 1938-2 CUM. BULL. 59.
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contracts of sale relating to the production of oil and gas from the property
in question. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the co-lessees were
tenants in common and that the operator acted as their agent in developing
the properties and marketing the output. They were, therefore, liable for
any acts committed by the agent within the limitations of his authority and
as such distinguishable from stockholders of a corporation. Accordingly,
the Board held, there was not an association taxable as a corporation. In
Comm. v. Horeshoe Lease Syndicate, 110 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1940) the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained a finding of the Board of Tax
Appeals that co-owners who granted the authority to develop and market to an operator by a power of attorney constituted a partnership rather
than a corporation. The majority of the court regarded the question
as one of fact with respect to which the finding of the Board of Tax
Appeals had to be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. In finding that it was supported by substantial evidence the court relied on the
fact that the co-lessees had not achieved limited liability, management was
not elected, no meetings vere held, no b-i-laws enacted, and the co-ovineys
8 34
had no voice in management.
If the co-lessees do not constitute a corporation, are they taxable as
individuals or as a partnership? Inasmuch as partners are taxed on their
proportionate share of partnership net income as individuals 335 for many
purposes, it does not make any difference whether they constitute a partnership or not. However, inasmuch as a partnership has a separate election
with respect to the deduction of intangible drilling and development
costs3 3 6 it is important for this purpose and possibly for others to determine
whether co-lessees constitute a partnership. 337 Internal Revenue Service
regards such arrangements (assuming that they are not an association taxand one
able as a corporation) as creating a "qualified partnership6' '
commentator 339 has suggested that the ruling of the Internal Revenue Service permits the co-lessees to determine whether they are to be considered a
partnership or not although the language of the ruling itself is not clear
in this respect. The Tax Court recently held that co-lessees did not constitute an association relying in large part on the fact that each co-lessee
disposed of his own share of production and found that they constituted
a partnership with a separate election as to the deduction of intangibles
where they had consistently filed a partnership return of income.3 40
Assuming that co-lessees constitute an association taxable as a corporation, the owners of royalties (landowner's and overriding), oil pay334. Comm. v. Horseshoe Lease Syndicate, 110 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1940).
335. INT. REV. CODE Sec. 181 provides as follows: "Individuals carrying on business in
partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity."
336. Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comm., 20 T. C. --------- No. 76 (May 29, 1953).
337. E.g., whether investors who acquire an interest in an oil and gas well can deduct intangibles. See note 131 ard related text.
338. I. T. 3930, 1948-2 CuM. BULL. 126.
339. Comment, II OIL AND GAS TAX QUARTERLY 253 (1953).
No. 76 (May 29, 1953).
340. Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comra., 20 T.C-.........
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ments, net profit interests, etc., are not members of the association and are
taxed as individuals. 341 A corporation as a co-lessee can become a member
of an association taxable as a corporation and in this regard the considerations heretofore noted are appropriate in determining whether an association of this type exists.3 42 If a corporation enters into an operating agreement that is improperly drawn in this respect, the proceeds will be taxed
as that of a separate corporation and the corporate stockholders in effect

will be subject to double-plus taxation.

43

UNITIZATION

The typical unit agreement results in effect in exchanging an oil and
gas interest in specifically described acreage for a lesser interest of the
same type in a larger tract.3 44 This is apparent when unitization is accompublished by the actual exchange of cross-assignments. It is substantially
true where unitization is accomplished by committing a particular oil and
gas interest to the unit agreement without actually transferring title. In
either event the transaction essentially involves the exchange of property
of a like kind and as such is a non-taxable exchange.3 45 The participant
in the unit has in effect a fractional undivided interest in the unit with
respect to which he can take depletion and deduct intangibles to the same
extent as a fractional interest holder in any other type of oil and gas
right.3 46 Whether the unit participants constitute an association taxable
as a corporation depends upon the same considerations previously noted
3 47
with respect to the development of oil and gas properties by co-owners.
FORMS

Regulation 118, Sec. 39.23 (m)-11 requires every taxpayer claiming a
deduction for depletion and depreciation of mineral property to keep
accurate accounts recording the cost of other basis of the mineral deposit
and the plant and equipment together with subsequent allowable capital
additions and all other required adjustments. The regulations also require
that the taxpayer taking depletion or depreciation with respect to mineral
341. Among other things there would not with respect to such interest appear to be
• . . centralized control of group affairs," which is one of the prerequisites to
taxation as an association. I. T. 3930, 1948-2 CUM. BULL. 126, 128.
342. Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comm., supra note 340.
343. That is the association would pay the initial corporate tax, the corporation would
have to regard 15% of the income -received as part of their gross income for tax
purposes (INT. REv. CODE Secs. 13 and 26 (b)) and if the corporation distributed its
earnings the stockholders would be taxed on their proportionate share of such
earnings.
344. There are very few decisions, rulings, etc., specifically dealing with tax problems
resulting from unitization agreements. Accordingly, considerable reliance has to be
placed on rulings and decisions rendered in analgous situations.
345. Comm. v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir .1941) ; E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940);
I. T. 4093, 1952-2 CUM. BULL. 130; Unitizations Involving Cash Adjustments Upon
Formation,III OIL AND GAS TAX QUARTERLY 1 (1953).
346. Supra 86-107. Hill, Tax Problems Arising Out of Unitization Agreements in
PROCEEDINGS OF THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 427
(1942).
347. Supra 127-130.

A

GUIDE TO FEDERAL OIL AND GAS INCOME TAXATION

3 48
The
properties submit the detailed data specified by the regulations.
information required with respect to depletion data relating to oil and
gas properties, can be furnished on Form 0 which can be obtained by
request from the office of any director of internal revenue. If a taxpayer
takes a deduction for worthless mineral rights, he should submit Form 927,
Proof of Worthlesness of Mineral Rights.

The usual income tax forms are used by a taxpayer reporting income
from oil and gas properties and the form used in this respect depends upon
whether the taxpayer is an individual, partnership, trust or corporation.
Oil and gas taxpayers operating properties as co-lessees under a form of co349
do
ownership not resulting in an association taxable as a corporation
may
but
income,
of
return
partnership
1065,
Form
complete
not have to
simply "attach thereto a schedule showing the total working interest, names
and addresses of the co-owners, the percentage of each co-owners' interest
in the co-ownership, total costs and expenses billed each co-owner with
respect to drilling for and producing the oil and gas and the total revenue
credited in those cases where the operating co-owners distributed revenues
to the other co-owner (by way of cash or credit) from the sale or other
disposition of the co-owner's oil and gas." 35 0 If the co-lessees desire to be
taxed as a partnership, it is probably advisable for them to submit a completed Form 1065 and an accompanying schedule. However, one tax
commentator has suggested that the current Service ruling 35 1 permits the
co-lessees to regard themselves as individuals not comprising a partnership
and that if this is their intent they should not have the operator file Form
1065 and the accompanying schedule, but should submit the same infor3' 2
mation by schedules attached to their individual returns.
CONCx.USION
We conclude as we began with a note of caution. The law relating to
oil and gas income taxation is technical, complex, and in a constant state
of flux. An attempt has been made in this article to set forth the law as
found in the appropriate statutes, regulations, rulings and judicial decisions
to the extent that it has crystallized. In the area in which the law is not
clear an effort has been made to set forth the position of the Internal
Revenue Service and to indicate the extent to which the courts have in the
past and may in the future disagree with the Commissioner. In this latter
area in particular the practitioner will want to consult the original sources
and more specialized discussions when such problems arise.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, Sec, 39.23 (m) -12 and 13.
See supra 127-130.
1. T. 2785, XIII-1 CuM. BULL. 96 (1934).
I. T. 3930, 1948-2 CUM. BuLL. 126.
Comment, OIL AND GAS TAX QUARTERLY 235 (1953).

